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Abstract
Augustus De Morgan’s career is characterized by a ceaseless joint attention to mathematics and logic. In
this essay, we investigate the factors that urged him to become involved with logic, first in connection with the
instruction of geometry, and subsequently with algebra. We hold that his attempt to reduce Euclidean geometry
to syllogistic form in 1831 stemmed largely from his perusal of S.F. Lacroix’s Essais, while his wish to defend
G. Peacock’s advanced algebra as a basic component of Cambridge education in 1835 led him to establish
significant links between algebra, mechanics, and logic.
 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Résumé
Le parcours professionnel d’Augustus De Morgan se caractérise par son double intérêt pour les mathématiques
et la logique. Dans ce travail nous examinons les facteurs qui l’ont encouragé à travailler dans le domaine de la
logique, en rapport avec l’enseignement de la géométrie et ensuite de l’ algèbre. Nous y affirmons que sa tentative
en 1831 de réduire la géométrie euclidienne à la forme syllogistique résultait en grande partie de sa lecture de
l’Essais de S.F. Lacroix, et que sa volonté de défendre l’inclusion de l’algèbre avancée de G. Peacock dans le plan
d’études de Cambridge en 1835 lui a permis d’établir des liens significatifs entre algèbre, mécanique, et logique.
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1.1. An outline of De Morgan’s career in algebra and logic
Of twenty years of experience as a teacher of mathematics, I may now affirm that the first half of the period established in my mind
the conviction that formal logic is a most important preliminary part of every sound system of exact science and that the second half
has strengthened that conviction. [De Morgan, 1847]1
Augustus De Morgan (1806–1871) matriculated at Trinity College, Cambridge, in 1823, graduating a
fourth wrangler2 in 1827. Appointed Professor of Mathematics at the newly founded London University
in 1828, he spent his entire career there until 1866, apart from his resignation from 1831 to 1836
as a protest against administrative practices.3 Deeply concerned with the instruction of elementary
mathematics, he perceived in 1831 the utility of Aristotelian logic in the teaching of Euclidean geometry.
Ever since, De Morgan was equally attentive to mathematics and logic, contributing to the advancement
of algebra, the extension of syllogistic logic, and the founding of the logic of relations. In the ensuing
outline we can see the close interaction between his algebraic and logical queries, along with his smooth
passage from the lower and more specific to the higher and more general forms of algebra and logic over
the years.4
Stage 1: From elementary mathematics to algebra and logic (1828–1839)
During this period, De Morgan produced the majority of his textbooks on elementary mathematics,
as well as his articles on the instruction of mathematics. In his booklet On the Study and Difficulties of
Mathematics [De Morgan, 1831a], cited as SDM, he paid singular attention to logic as a prerequisite
to the study of geometry. His views were elaborated in his First Notions of Logic [De Morgan, 1839],
a book designed for students of geometry. In 1835 he reviewed George Peacock’s Algebra [Peacock,
1830], eager to promote this pioneering account of advanced algebra as an indispensable preliminary part
of the calculus and mechanics within Cambridge education. In his review [De Morgan, 1835a], he raised
links between algebra and logic, thus sealing his life-long interest in the foundations of mathematics and
logic. This interest became evident in his article on the “Calculus of functions” (COF), published in the
Encyclopedia Metropolitana (EM) in 1836.5 There De Morgan developed his method of abstraction and
1 From a manuscript preface to his Formal Logic [De Morgan, 1847], University of London Library, MS. 775/353.
2 Cambridge students earned their degree by passing the University Senate House Examinations, known as the Tripos (see
Footnote 58). The denomination of “wrangler” was derived from the process of wrangling, that is, “the debating method used
to test undergraduates before the advent of written examinations” [Crilly, 1999, 133]. See also [Becher, 1980b, 4–6; Durand,
2000, 140–141; Rice, 1997b, 20–24].
3 On De Morgan’s life and career, see [S. De Morgan, 1882; Rice, 1997b]. The latter focuses on De Morgan as a teacher in the
context of London mathematics, a role previously overlooked. On his resignation, see [Rice, 1997b, 87–97]. On De Morgan’s
publications, see [Smith, 1982, 141–147], and on his manuscripts, see [Rice, 1997b, 349–357].
4 The outline is based upon [Panteki, 1992, Chapters 3, 6] on De Morgan’s mathematical and logical contributions. For
convenience, we divide his career into four stages, each stage roughly equivalent to a decade. However, different divisions may
be found in [Merrill, 1990; Pycior, 1983], in connection with De Morgan’s logical and algebraic career, respectively.
5 Objecting to his “Treatise” (of 75 quarto double pages in small print) being “locked up” in EM, De Morgan agreed with
the proprietors of the encyclopedia to have his article reprinted on its own account [De Morgan, 1838, 15]. The outcome of this
agreement remains unclear; see also [Todhunter, 1876, I, 85]. However, although the volume of EM containing this essay bears
the date 1845, there exists a separate offprint, dated 1836.
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calculi of functions and operations. Successfully applied in the extension of the domain of algebra, this
method would later on govern his mature work on logic.
Stage 2: On the foundations of algebra and “formal logic” (1839–1849)
De Morgan furnished his treatise on the Calculus [De Morgan, 1842] by drawing, among other sources,
on his COF and the recent development of the calculus of operations.6 The same sources, including
Peacock’s book, served as a basis for his four papers “On the foundations of algebra,” contributed
between 1839 and 1844. These papers, together with his Trigonometry and Double Algebra [De Morgan,
1849] constitute his basic share in the advancement of algebra, including his near definition of the axioms
which characterize the field of complex numbers.7 De Morgan’s project as regards the extension and
formalization of algebra was succeeded by his attempt to enlarge the system of Aristotelian syllogistic,
a concern rooted in SDM. As a result, he produced his first paper “On the syllogism” [De Morgan, 1846],
followed by his book on Formal Logic [De Morgan, 1847]. The latter, in conjunction with George Boole’s
Mathematical Analysis of Logic (1847), mark a new era in the development of “algebraic logic.”8 By that
time, the Scottish philosopher William Hamilton had accused De Morgan of plagiarism, in connection
with the issue of “quantification of the predicate.”9 The accusation gave rise to a controversy between
the two men in 1846, which continued well after Hamilton’s death in 1856, motivating De Morgan (and
Boole) to speculate on the validity and utility of applying mathematical methods to logic.10
Stage 3: On the ultimate extension and formalization of logic (1850–1860)
This period witnessed the highlight of De Morgan’s logical contributions, which consisted of three
more papers “On the syllogism” [De Morgan, 1850, 1858, 1860a], a booklet on the Syllabus of Logic,
and an encyclopedic article on “Logic,” both published in 1860. From among these, we single out
[De Morgan, 1860a] his masterpiece on the “Logic of relations” (LOR), De Morgan’s achievement
of pure, formal logic. The latter resulted from the method of abstraction and generalization of the
copula, which was developed in [De Morgan, 1858], amounting to the gradual separation of “form”
from “matter.” Alluding to his paper on the COF, De Morgan was happy to note that the “form–matter”
distinction “exists in all thought,” although it is “more familiar” to the mathematician [De Morgan, 1858,
6 De Morgan’s treatise had a significant impact on the development of the calculus of operations, serving as a basic source
for Boole’s original contributions in 1844 [Panteki, 2000, 173–174].
7 See [Koppelman, 1971, 218–220; Panteki, 1992, Section 3.9; Pycior, 1983, 221–224; Richards, 1980, 354–357; Smith,
1981].
8 As recently brought forward in [Valencia, 2001], De Morgan reviewed Boole’s book in 1848, pinpointing their distinct
approaches to the mathematization of logic. However, despite their varied procedures, both works belong to the realms
of “algebraic logic,” in so far as they are based on Lagrangian algebras. Algebraic logic should be distinguished from
“mathematical logic,” as stemming from Cauchy’s and Weierstrass’ foundations of mathematical analysis [Grattan-Guinness,
2000, 570].
9 According to traditional logic, there are four standard forms of categorical propositions, denoted by the letters A, I, E,
and O. By means of the quantification of the predicate, each form is split into two. For instance, form A, “All X is Y ,” is split
into “All X is some Y ” and “All X is all Y .” On the invention of this doctrine by G. Bentham [1827], T. Solly [1839], Hamilton
(late 1830s), and De Morgan [1846], see [Jevons, 1873; Lewis, 1918, 33–36; Panteki, 1993, 153, 161–162; Styazhkin, 1969,
148–157].
10 On the early stage of the De Morgan–Hamilton controversy see [Laita, 1979], the first historian to point out its immediate
impact upon Boole. On its later impact upon De Morgan’s inquiries, see [Panteki, 1992, Sections 6.6–6.7].
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said to have attained its full meaning in [De Morgan, 1858],11 a paper imbued by Hamilton’s influence,
and one to reveal its debt to [De Morgan, 1836].12
Stage 4: The formalization of algebra revisited (1860–1866)
After his breakthrough with logic (enriched with a final paper “On the syllogism V” in 1862),
De Morgan resumed his algebraic inquiries, considering his former project of algebra’s formalization
from a different angle. Until the mid-1840s, logic had been considered as “a most important preliminary
part of every sound system of exact science,”13 primarily connected with instruction in geometry and
algebra. From then onward, algebraic and functional methods served as powerful tools and devices
of utmost utility in De Morgan’s advanced logical contributions, leading the way to the LOR. That
achieved, it was once again time to reverse the role of the two disciplines, and look for the model for
the formalization of algebra in the general methods of pure logic. This newly conceived project stood
at the core of De Morgan’s last major contribution to mathematics, his paper “On infinity and the sign
of equality” [De Morgan, 1865, 180], where he wrote, referring to Peacock’s foundation of symbolic
algebra: “This is a very near approach to the assertion that algebra is, like logic, a formal science: nothing
was wanted but an introduction and incorporation of that distinction between form and matter, which now
rules in the definition of pure logic.” However, his career was nearing its end, with no scope therefore for
the pursuit of this project. His life-long passion for the foundations of mathematics and logic, along with
his deep parallel interest in their history, was manifested once again in his Speech [De Morgan, 1866],
which was delivered at the first meeting of the London Mathematical Society (LMS) on 16 January
1865.14
1.2. Survey of the literature and scope of our study
The recollection of these will furnish abundant opportunities for a very important exercise, the detection of incorrect reasoning, an
exercise which will be the more instructive, as by the occurrence of great names, in connection with fallacies and misconceptions,
the student will perceive that brilliant intellect, unaccompanied by habits of correct thinking, has often led its possessor to the direct
path of error, and that if he neglect the constant improvement of the mental faculties, he may perhaps acquire profound knowledge,
but will never reason with accuracy. [De Morgan, 1828, 24]
The above quotation is from De Morgan’s “Introductory lecture,” delivered at the opening of his classes
at London University on 5 November 1828.15 Characterized by a “profound mathematical erudition”
and a strong educational background, this lecture reveals above all “the importance De Morgan places
on logic and reason in the development of the intellect” [Rice, 1997b, 72–73]. What were the sources
11 On the origins and first systematic use of the term “formal logic,” with emphasis on De Morgan [1858], see [Hodges, 2000].
12 Motivated by Grattan-Guinness [1988, 74], Merrill [1990], and Panteki [1992] questioned the plausible impact of
[De Morgan, 1836] upon his LOR. The two surveys are complementary, respectively arguing against and for such a significant
impact. Moreover, the former presents the LOR from a modern standpoint, which is missing in the latter, while lacking a
full-length exploration of its mathematical background, supplied in the latter.
13 See our introductory quote, Footnote 1.
14 On the LMS, see [Rice, 1995]. Further on [De Morgan, 1866], see [Richards, 1987]. On De Morgan’s contributions to the
history of science, see [Rice, 1996].
15 Brought forward in [Rice, 1997b, 67–73], this lecture belongs to University College, London, MS.Add.3, cited as
[De Morgan, 1828]. Our pagination corresponds to that of the manuscript.
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establishment of “correct thinking,” apparently leading the way to his dual contemplation of logic and
geometry three years later?
De Morgan’s mature work on logic engaged the attention of historians in the 1870s, ceaselessly con-
tinuing to the present day.16 The aim of most surveys was to record his rather chaotic presentation of
logic in a systematic and lucid way, with a view to evaluating De Morgan’s share in the development of
formal logic.17 In the 1990s, new light was shed upon the genesis and status of the LOR, as well as its
mathematical background, by Merrill [1990] and Panteki [1992], respectively. Merrill was the first histo-
rian to consider the logical novelties introduced in SDM and the Notions [Merrill, 1990, Chapters 1, 2].
However, an investigation that would account for De Morgan’s initiative in reducing geometrical reason-
ing to syllogistic form is missing from his survey, a fact hardly surprising, however, given the absence of
similar concerns in the prevailing British tradition of Aristotelian logic in De Morgan’s time.
On the other hand, De Morgan’s algebraic contributions took longer to be appreciated than those of
his logic. Commencing with Nagel [1935], historians orientated their research towards an evaluation
of De Morgan’s papers “On the foundations of algebra” from a modern standpoint, while his broader
algebraic approach towards the calculi of functions and relations suffered from near neglect.18 The
1980s was a turning point in the historiography of early 19th century British algebra, marked by the
attempts of H. Pycior and J. Richards to account for the elusive character of algebra at that time, and
also bring forward De Morgan’s idiosyncratic oscillation between formalism and conceptualism. They
did so by stressing the role of extra-algebraic factors, like philosophy and religion, in shaping the views
of British algebraists, as well as taking under consideration neglected aspects of De Morgan’s work,
such as his educational concerns, his debt to the history of mathematics, and his review of Peacock’s
textbook.19 Nevertheless, there still remain unexplored areas, such as, for instance, De Morgan’s
apparent background in French epistemology, or the full import of his review of 1835, which potentially
endangered the stability of the curriculum at Cambridge, as supported in William Whewell’s treatises on
mechanics in 1832.
The aim of our study is to fill in certain of the above-mentioned lacunae in current bibliography.
Focusing exclusively on the very early stage of De Morgan’s career, between 1828 and 1835, we seek
16 In chronological order we note the following surveys: [Liard, 1878, 71–97], [Halsted, 1884], [Lewis, 1918, 37–51], [Kneale,
1962, 426–428], [Prior, 1962, 141–156], [Heath, 1966, vii–xxxi], [Styazhkin, 1969, 161–169], [Hawkins, 1979], [Merrill, 1990],
[Panteki, 1992, Chapter 6], [Hawkins, 1995], and [Grattan-Guinness, 2000, 26–37].
17 In many histories of logic, “formal logic” covers both traditions of “algebraic” and “mathematical” logic from the mid-19th
century onwards. On these terms see Footnotes 8 and 11.
18 Among the early studies of British algebra, hinting at De Morgan’s allegedly formal approach to algebra, we note [Clock,
1964, 17–105; Koppelman, 1971, 215–220; Nagel, 1935; Novy, 1973, 189–199]. Koppelman and Novy hinted at the importance
of [De Morgan, 1836] and its relevance to his work on algebra. De Morgan’s study of functional equations in 1836, along with
Babbage’s earlier work on this branch, were omitted in [Dhombres, 1986], a study of the history of functional equations in more
than one variable.
19 Exclusive works on De Morgan’s algebra are relatively few; see [Pycior, 1983; Richards, 1980, 354–357; Richards, 1987].
However, we wish to note additionally [Pycior, 1981, 1982, 1984; Richards, 1991, 1992], [Durand, 1990, 1996, 2000; Fisch,
1994, 1999], which offer critical reviews of the studies mentioned in Footnote 18, providing new standpoints for the peculiar
state of British algebra early in the century. Interestingly enough, these studies largely omit to take under consideration the
algebras of operations, functions and logical entities. The latter are briefly noted in [Grattan-Guinness, 1997, Chapter 9] in the
context of a general history of mathematics and in [Grattan-Guinness, 2000, Chapter 2] in the context of the history of logic.
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this end, we draw attention to Condillac’s semiotic philosophy, as elaborated in his Logique [Condillac,
1780] and in La langue des calculs [Condillac, 1798]. The latter work and S.F. Lacroix’s Essais
sur l’enseignement [Lacroix, 1828]—first published in 1805—were both cited with approval in SDM.
Although we lack evidence as to De Morgan’s first acquaintance with Lacroix’s survey on mathematical
education, we will nevertheless show that several of its sources underlined De Morgan’s defense of
mathematical studies from 1828 onwards, while his SDM was shaped in line with the Essais. Last but
not least, while the basics of traditional logic as displayed in SDM drew on R. Whately’s Elements of
Logic [Whately, 1826], we argue that De Morgan’s original attempt to apply syllogistic logic to Euclidean
geometry stemmed from Lacroix.
Thus covering De Morgan’s educational and epistemological concerns up to about 1833, we conclude
by shedding new light on his review, where he demanded the incorporation of logic within the Cambridge
curriculum, by holding that it is “an easier science than algebra” and one which “the student must have
in one sense, before he can ever become a mathematician” [De Morgan, 1835a, 293, 311]. Peacock’s
foundation of symbolic algebra in 1830 and De Morgan’s critical reception of it in 1835 will not be
discussed, as the subject has been amply dealt with in recent studies, and does not pertain to De Morgan’s
interest in logic at the time.20 We are challenged, though, by De Morgan’s polemic against the teaching
of mechanics that prevailed through Whewell in the early 1830s, an issue interestingly linked with
De Morgan’s plea for both algebra and logic to be seen as prerequisites for the study of the calculus
and mechanics. This last part of our survey is further motivated by the following question: was it a pure
coincidence that soon after the review’s publication, Whewell published his Thoughts on the Study of
Mathematics as a Part of a Liberal Education [Whewell, 1835], a polemic against Continental mechanics,
which opened with a comparison between geometry and logic to end with the dismissal of both advanced
algebra and logic from a future curriculum?
Thus questioning De Morgan’s early links between logic and geometry and between logic and algebra
respectively, we wish to stress the subtle blend of his strong background in French epistemology and
his Cambridge heritage in mathematics and mechanics, hopefully paving the way for a thorough future
study on the mutual development of algebra and logic from 1830 onwards. If occasional lack of sufficient
evidence results in tentative arguments, we feel entitled to carry on and follow De Morgan’s own motto:
“We go as far as we can, and we try to see what we can: to ask a question is a step in knowledge, and
even if there be no answer it is a preparation for an answer” [De Morgan, 1858, 105].
1.3. Structure of the paper
The joint study of diverse sciences is the most appropriate means to discover the general method, which must direct the human mind
in the search for truth. [Lacroix, 1828, 24]
In Section 2.1 we investigate the mathematical and epistemological background of Lacroix’s Essais,
pointing out the individual power of its sources, along with clarifying the ambiguous notion of “logique”
during his time. We proceed in Section 2.2 by questioning the multidimensional meaning of “logique” in
Lacroix’s own discourse, holding that his peculiar approach to traditional syllogistic logic forms a link
20 [Pycior, 1981, 1982, 1983] cover a study of Peacock’s Algebra and De Morgan’s reaction to it. See also [Richards, 1980,
1987] and [Fisch, 1999].
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century England (Section 3.1). This revival was due to Richard Kirwan’s and Richard Whately’s support
of the scientific status of logic in 1807 and 1826, respectively. We conclude with the critical reception of
Whately’s Elements by British logicians and philosophers during the period 1827–1833 (Section 3.2).
Section 4 covers De Morgan’s Cambridge entourage, dealing in turn with his mathematical
background, as largely influenced by the contributions of the Analytical Society (Section 4.1), Whewell’s
oscillation between Newton and Laplace in the teaching of mechanics (Section 4.2), and De Morgan’s
potential as a graduate, with a focus on the influence of his teachers and tutors (Section 4.3). In Section 5
we illustrate Lacroix’s multidimensional impact on De Morgan’s educational writings between 1828 and
1833. We focus first on De Morgan’s views on the status of mathematics and particularly the instruction
of arithmetic and elementary algebra, pinpointing numerous similarities between SDM and Lacroix’s
Essais (Section 5.1). We then move on with his speculations on the amount of “reasoning” involved in the
teaching of geometry and algebra, and his comparative study of the two disciplines in SDM (Section 5.2),
prior to entering into his application of syllogistic logic to geometry in the ensuing chapter of the same
book (Section 5.3).
Having thus argued on Lacroix’s impact upon De Morgan’s early logical inquiries, we question
the background and import of De Morgan’s review of Peacock’s Algebra (Section 6). We begin with
Whewell’s reaction to the expansion of the Cambridge curriculum in the early 1830s (Section 6.1),
focusing next on De Morgan’s critical view of the Cambridge educational system and his emphasis in
1835 on the utility of both algebra and logic (Section 6.2). Hinting at the plausible impact of his review
upon Whewell’s Thoughts (Section 6.3), we display a summary of our survey, enriched with questions
of potential influence for further research on that crucial period of the 1830s in and around Cambridge
University (Section 7).
2. Lacroix’s philosophy of instruction, 1805
2.1. The epistemological background of Lacroix’s Essais
I have always directed my thoughts to the means of presenting scientific results in the most simple manner and the most natural order.
[Lacroix, 1828, 168]
An eminent instructor and textbook writer, Lacroix (1765–1843) launched his career in 1779 by
inquiring into planetary mechanics, in line with the leading scientists of his time.21 At Cambridge, he
became widely known for the encyclopedic three-volume Traité du calcul (1797–1800), the abridged
version of which (1802) was translated by the Analytical Society in 1816.22 The Cambridge dons,
however, were largely indifferent to his major work on the didactics of mathematics, his Essais sur
l’enseignement en général, et sur celui des mathématiques en particulier (1805). Addressed exclusively
21 See [Taton, 1959, 127–130; Wilson, 1980, 280]. Condorcet had also been occupied with the three-body problem a decade
earlier [Baker, 1975, 8]. On Lacroix as a textbook writer and instructor, see [Grattan-Guinness, 1990, 112–115; Schubring,
1987].
22 Lacroix’s Traité included D’Alembert’s limits, the Leibniz–Euler approach, and Lagrange’s algebraic calculus; see
[Grattan-Guinness, 1990, 139–142; 1992b, 17–20]. On the diffusion of his work at Cambridge, see [Ashworth, 1996; Becher,
1995; Enros, 1983; Topham, 2000].
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and students’ editions were differentiated for the first time. Lacroix’s Essais enjoyed several editions in
France, but was never translated into English.23
In its third, enlarged edition of 1828, upon which we draw, the author retained his admiration for
the liberal scientific spirit of the French Enlightenment [Lacroix, 1828, 5–38]. His rich teaching and
administrative experience were amply manifested in the first part of the Essais (39–167), which included
an indepth survey of the diverse institutions that flourished in France after 1789. The second part focused
on the philosophy (168–230) and practice (231–344) of mathematical instruction, with emphasis on the
teaching of algebra and geometry. Lacroix’s discourse was characterized by his immense erudition in the
history of instruction and his awareness of the latter’s relevance to logic. As we shall see, he deployed
the term “logique” in a multiplicity of ways, its conception ranging from Aristotelian logic to theories of
ideas and signs peculiar to the study of language.
In connection with geometry, Lacroix drew almost exclusively on A. Arnauld’s and P. Nicole’s La
logique, ou l’art de penser (1662). Referring to it as the “Port-Royal Logic” (PRL), he recommended the
study of its last part on “Method,” the main ideas of which were derived from Pascal’s and Descartes’
rules on the teaching of geometry.24 His demand for “simplicity” and “natural order” in teaching stemmed
from the PRL theory of clear and distinct ideas and signs, and was consistent with his other major source,
Laplace’s lectures on algebra delivered at the short-lived Ecole Normale of 1795.25 The list of authorities
cited in the Essais also included Newton, Leibniz, Locke, D’Alembert, Diderot, Voltaire, Condillac,
Condorcet, Lagrange, and Monge, with references to the educator Pestalozzi (33) and Rousseau’s Emile
(306, 323–325).
Lacroix recommended the study of D’Alembert’s and Diderot’s Encyclopédie (1751–1772), along
with Euler’s Letters to a German Princess (1768–1772), two sources of opposing views on logic. With
no entry on “Logic,” but only with entries on issues pertaining to language, the Encyclopédie reflected
the indifference, or even hostility, of the French “philosophes” toward formal logic (here standing for
syllogistic logic).26 By contrast, Euler’s text adopted Leibniz’s device of illustrating logical relations
through geometrical representations, in line with his firm belief that “the reasoning by means of which
23 Commented upon in [Hodgkin, 1981, 65–66; Richards, 1991, 302–303], the historically neglected Essais was reedited in
1816, 1828, 1838, and 1894. In text we draw upon the third edition, providing our own translations of the quoted passages. Our
sole evidence for the circulation of this work at Cambridge prior to 1831 remain Whewell’s personal notes from the Essais,
dated 8 February 1821 [Whewell Papers, Trinity College Library, R.18.98, pp. 14–15].
24 The PRL was divided into four parts, dealing respectively with “Conception,” “Judgment,” “Reasoning,” and “Method.”
Including elements of syllogistic logic, the PRL influenced Enlightenment epistemology mainly through its fourth part; see
[Auroux, 1982; Baker, 1975, 97, 132, 160; Buickerood, 1985, 161, 176, 185; Foucault, 1970, 52–76]. On the rules for geometry
instruction, see [Kneale, 1962, 317; Lacroix, 1828, 275].
25 On the Ecole Normale, see [Dhombres, 1980; Glas, 1986]. Laplace’s lectures are edited with notes in [Dhombres, 1992].
In text we draw from a reprint of them in Laplace’s Œuvres complètes, cited as [Laplace, 1795].
26 The origin of the term “formal logic” stems from Kant [Hodges, 2000]. In text we deploy it, in line with Buickerood [1985,
159], as a synonym for Aristotelian syllogistic, in order to distinguish it from other alternative systems on the art of reasoning,
attributed to Bacon, Descartes, Locke, Condillac, and others. On the Encyclopédie, see [Hankins, 1985, 163–170; Lacroix,
1828, 15, 174, 306]. Covering issues on “Etymology” or “Grammar,” this work was strikingly devoid of articles on “Logic,” as
noted by Aarsleff [1982b, 147–148], Auroux [1982, 21, 53], Fraser [1989, 329–330, fn], and Rider [1990, 114].
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Condorcet in 1786 on a reedition of Euler’s Letters, to serve as a text for Lacroix’s course at the Lycée
of Paris [Taton, 1959, 153–158], we conclude that Lacroix must have been familiar with Euler’s ideas on
the utility of traditional logic.
There remains, however, an open question as to Lacroix’s acquaintance with two other contributions
to logic: Condorcet’s essay on universal language, intended as a sequel to his Tableaux historique (1794);
and the syllogistic intonations of the PRL itself. The answer seems to be negative, upon the grounds that
Condorcet’s adoption of a kind of symbolic logic, echoing Leibniz’s ideas, was then still unpublished and
apparently unknown [Baker, 1975, Chapter 6; Granger, 1954]. And furthermore, the semimathematical
treatment of logical conversion and syllogistic which enriched the PRL had no impact upon Lacroix’s
predecessors.28
Another work pertinent to “logique” which was cited by Lacroix was Condillac’s Logique ou les
premiers développements de l’art de penser [Condillac, 1780]. As implied by its title, Condillac’s book
was indebted to the PRL. However, contrary to the PRL, Condillac was hostile to Aristotelian syllogistic,
his conception of “logique” stemming from Locke’s Essay on human understanding [Locke, 1690],
a work misinterpreted by Voltaire and his followers as a treatise on logic [Buickerood, 1985]. For Locke
alternatively deployed in its last chapter, “Of the Divisions of Sciences,” the three terms “Semiotiki” (in
Greek), the “doctrine of signs,” and “logic,” to define “the ways and means whereby the knowledge [. . .] is
attained and communicated” [Locke, 1690, 309]. Hence the origin of Condillac’s “semiotic philosophy,”
as based on his conception of science as a language, “probably the most influential concept of science
developed by the French representatives of the Enlightenment” [Jahnke, 1981, 79].29
Condillac used the term “analysis” in place of “logique” as the method by which we trace our ideas
back to their origin, observing their generation and comparing them under every possible relation.
Analysis stemmed from sensual experience and the use of signs. As he claimed, “nature gives us the
first lessons of the art of thinking” [Condillac, 1780, 45] and ultimately the notion of classification
[Condillac, 1780, 87–112]. His next concern was with linking analysis to language, whereas his final
verdict was based upon the observation that algebra, as handled by Euler and Lagrange, proved that
“the progress of the sciences depends upon the progress of their languages” (305). In brief, algebra was
considered an indispensable analytical method of discovery and a scientific language par excellence.
Condillac’s epistemology had a great impact on the classification and nomenclature of science,
including Lavoisier’s chemical notation [Baker, 1975, 87–128; Foucault, 1970, 54–76; Gillispie, 1960,
200–260; Lacroix, 1828, 18–24, 151]. In conjunction with Condorcet’s views on social science, it also
motivated the movement of “idéologie,” a term devised by Destutt de Tracy in 1796 for the new “science
27 [Euler, 1812, I, 475]. On logic, and what became known as “Euler diagrams,” see letters C–CVII at pp. 444–494. See also
[De Morgan, 1847, 323; Kneale, 1962, 349–350], where notice is also taken of Gergonne’s adoption of these diagrams. On
Euler’s famous popularization of science, see [Callinger, 1976].
28 Auroux [1982] claims that the PRL anticipated Boole’s and De Morgan’s algebraization of logic in 1847. However, the
PRL did not exert any influence through its unusual treatment of formal logic, and this was mainly due to its authors, who
cautiously warned their reader against any detailed study of syllogistic logic, apparently influenced by Bacon’s and Descartes’
hostile reaction to Aristotle’s logic [Kneale, 1962, 319–320].
29 On the influence of Logique upon the scientific language of the enlightenment, see [Albury, 1980; Baker, 1975, Chapter 2;
Gillispie, 1960, 150–190]. On the term “semiotiki,” see [Buickerood, 1985, 177]. The PRL was the starting point for both Locke
and Condillac, but their conceptions of “logique” differ in many ways. A comparative study of these three works has yet to be
undertaken.
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“universal grammar,” exerting influence upon educational policies.30 What mainly prevailed with those
instructors who followed him was their emphasis on the interaction between progress in language and
progress in scientific discovery. This was strikingly visible in Laplace’s lectures in 1795.
Laplace compared the derivation of Newton’s binomial formula, a major theorem, with the process by
which he arrived at the law of gravity, claiming that “what one observes in analysis happens similarly in
nature” [Dhombres, 1992, 14–43; Laplace, 1795, 10–12, 35, 135, 150–156]. His students, armed with a
copy of Condillac’s book, would be initiated into the virtues of the language of algebra in line with the 7th
chapter of Logique.31 Within this context, Laplace discussed Condillac’s two major principles, “analogy”
and the “connection of ideas,”32 which constituted the ground of any comparative study [Laplace, 1795,
33–37]. He strongly favored “general methods in teaching” (84), admitting that “algebra furnishes always
the best methods” (103). Last, he alluded to his own intricate method of “generating functions,”33 eager
to persuade his audience that “the language of Analysis, the most perfect of all languages, is by itself a
powerful instrument of discovery” (156).
Lacroix’s Essais was composed at a time when the influence of signs upon mathematical reasoning
in France had reached its peak. Indicatively we refer to J.M. Dégerando’s Des signes et de l’art
de penser (1800), a work which encapsulated the prevailing conviction of leading philosophers and
mathematicians (Condillac’s enemies included) of the significance of algebraic signs in scientific
inquiry.34 This conviction was shared by Lacroix, by stressing the import of mathematical language
upon the recent “brilliant discoveries” [Lacroix, 1828, 6–27] in physical astronomy, notwithstanding the
fact that his own tract was devoid of symbols. In a text imbued with his predilection for the system of
education followed by Laplace in 1795, Lacroix summarized the latter’s lectures on algebra (246–273),
30 The term had no political connotation at the time. According to Tracy, “this science may be called idéologie if one attends
only to the subject-matter, universal grammar if one has reference only to the method, or logic if one considers only the goal”
[Kretzman, 1967, 390]. In accordance with this conception of philosophy “the traditional chairs of logic and metaphysics in the
écoles centrales were replaced in 1795 with chairs of universal grammar.” On French institutions of education, see [Grattan-
Guinness, 1990, Chapter 2; Lacroix, 1828, 27–36, 56–60; Richards, 1991, 299–300]. Another consequence of this movement
was the massive production of new textbooks; see [Baker, 1975, 391–395; Dhombres, 1980, 145–148; Rider, 1980, Chapter 8;
Rider, 1990, 132–140; Schubring, 1987].
31 A comparison between Condillac [1780, Chapter 7] and Laplace [1795, 33–37] is worthy of attention. The former dealt
with a problem of arithmetic, first using fingers, then spoken words, then numerals, eventually reducing it to the equations
x − 1 = y + 1 and x + 1 = 2y − 2 (pp. 287–303). On similar lines, Laplace stated an arithmetical problem rhetorically, to
clarify the symbolical representation of the statement “half the sum of two numbers added to half their difference gives the
greater of the two numbers” (pp. 33–34). On Condillac’s import upon the lectures delivered at the Ecole Normale see also
[Dhombres, 1992, 20, 35, 142, 165, 185].
32 The latter principle should be distinguished from Locke’s “association of ideas.” Condillac’s “liaison des idées” was
conceived in imitation of the concept of gravity in Newtonian philosophy [Aarsleff, 1982b, 199, Footnote 1].
33 Due to the limited duration of the school, Laplace had no opportunity to lecture on the calculus. Nonetheless, he advertised
his method (133, 146, 173), proud of its applications in celestial mechanics and probability theory. See further [Grattan-
Guinness, 1990, 161–183; Hald, 1990, 210–212; Panteki, 1992, Chapter 1].
34 On Dégerando, see [Kretzman, 1967, 388–389; Rider, 1990, 135–140]. From among Condillac’s most fierce opponents, we
single out J.D. Gergonne, editor of the Annales de mathématiques pures et appliquées in 1810 [Grattan-Guinness, 1990, 135–
137, 194]. On the philosophy of symbolic methods, which flourished in France after Lagrange, and its influence upon Cambridge
analysts, see [Ashworth, 1996, 632–641; Grattan-Guinness, 1988, 73–74; Grattan-Guinness, 1992a, 34–39; Koppelman, 1971;
Panteki, 1992, Chapters 1–2; Sherry, 1991].
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he recommended the writing of elementary textbooks which would facilitate the perusal of Laplace’s
Mécanique céleste (1799–1805), having already paved the way with his own Traité.36
2.2. Lacroix on “logique”
In order to win a race, it is better to exercise the legs than to reason upon the mechanism of walking. [Lacroix, 1828, 305]
Lacroix encouraged instructors to find their own suitable balance between a “very superficial” and
a “very rigorous” passage to the “true metaphysics” (i.e., foundations) of mathematics (174). He was
firm in his recommendations when they stemmed from indisputable authorities and ardently promoted
Laplace’s “general methods in teaching” (178).37 However, he expressed ambivalence when dealing with
issues for which the current theory and practice of instruction were unable yet to provide guidelines.
Such an example concerned the teaching of algebra and geometry and his dilemma about which of the
two subjects should be taught first (306–307). Although his answer was far from definite, Lacroix did
provide the reader with a flexible approach and a stimulating question.
We wish to note that this issue of priority was preceded by a similar one concerning the priority of
geometry versus logic (305). Lacroix’s overall consideration of logic was fragmentary, stemming from
three different sources. First of all, he referred to Aristotle and commented upon the role of his logic
within the history of philosophy and instruction (41–59). Then Condillac’s Logique entered into his
discourse, when he discussed the current philosophy of instruction (149–152, 218–224). Finally, he drew
on the PRL, strictly in connection with the teaching of geometry (274–307). As we shall see, for all
his hostility towards the pedantries of scholastic logic, Lacroix paid limited, albeit significant attention
to the study of formal, deductive logic, strictly distinguishing it from the latter two sources, which he
apparently viewed as two complementary vehicles of methodology.
When he referred to Condillac, Lacroix deployed the term “logique” as a synonym for “idéologie,”
which he placed first in the list of sciences that resulted from the “application of judgment” (149). To
ideology, he stressed, we owe the transformation of sensations into ideas, the combination of ideas into
judgments, and last the derivation from the latter of the rules that govern the search for truth (150).
According to Lacroix, Locke, and Condillac had rendered their ultimate service to “metaphysics” (i.e.,
epistemology) by arguing that first notions are derived from the senses and not from imagination (217).
This achievement pertained, however, only to the first stage of instruction. Lacroix accordingly advised
instructors to encourage their pupil to picture his first ideas “in objects of his senses” (170–172), but that
was the only aspect of Condillac’s epistemology appropriate to instruction in any way.
35 Clairaut’s Algèbre, a starting point for Condillac and Laplace, was reedited by Lacroix in 1797 [Dhombres, 1992, 16;
Schubring, 1987, 47]. See also [Schubring, 1996, 368] on Lacroix’s advocation of D’Alembert’s attitude towards the foundations
of algebra.
36 See Lacroix’s comments on pp. 37, 180. On Laplace’s contributions to celestial mechanics, see [Gillispie, 1978; Grattan-
Guinness, 1990, Chapter 5; Panteki, 1992, Chapter 1].
37
“Give your preference to general methods in teaching,” wrote Laplace (p. 84), “and devote yourself to presenting them as
simply as possible; you will see that they are nearly always the easiest methods as well.” Laplace meant to instill the spirit of
research into students, by promoting methods that would serve as potential tools for new discoveries. Upon this “revolutionary”
statement, see [Dhombres, 1992, 16; Richards, 1991, 316–317]. In connection with rigor, Lacroix stressed the importance of
providing proof of any mathematical result attained by induction [Lacroix, 1828, 261; Laplace, 1795, 8, 41, 152].
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had nothing original to offer the study of mathematics. He noted that by claiming that “algebra was a
language” Condillac was not far from the “lucid and precise” notions as furnished in Clairaut’s Algèbre
(1748). Moreover, he pointed out that this method of analysis was based upon vague definitions and
erroneous conceptions. Just as algebra could serve the purposes of a synthetic presentation, similarly,
argued Lacroix, geometry was not free from analysis, as in the case of reductio ad absurdum. It was also
noted that Condillac himself had built his Logique synthetically, not analytically, quite contrary to his
own theory.38
Although hardly an admirer of Aristotelian logic, Lacroix criticized Condillac for his neglect of this
discipline. Lacroix had indeed condemned excessive preoccupation with the complicated names and rules
of syllogistic logic and had stressed instead the import of Descartes’ own rules relating to the process
of scientific discovery (47). However, in the realms of instruction, he twice revealed his appreciation of
logic’s educational utility, linked with Condillac’s principle of the connection of ideas through the aid of
signs. He thus stated that “there is no need to neglect the discussion of logical forms, when they are not
abused, they can be a very useful exercise for the mind” (151). He further recommended Euler’s letters
on logic, calling them a “brief but illuminating” study of the “diverse forms of syllogistic” (221, fn.).
In line with Laplace, Lacroix regarded algebra as an ideal source for “general methods,” useful
both in teaching and in mathematical inquiry. However, under the joint influence of Euler and the
PRL, it was geometry which served as a paradigmatic model for training the mind in the “diverse
forms of reasoning” (305–306). As for the teaching of algebra, it sufficed to follow, after Clairaut,
the route of historical discovery (250–252). For the teaching of geometry, on the other hand, tradition
should be avoided, and instructors were urged to follow the PRL instead. Lacroix praised the PRL
contributions to the amendment of weaknesses spotted in the structure of Euclid’s Elements.39 Were
all of his recommendations to be taken into account, then (305):
Elements of geometry thus treated would become as it were excellent elements of Logic, and would perhaps be the only ones that it
would be necessary to study.
In order to support his claim, Lacroix argued that it is more useful to examine whether a geometrical
proposition is true or not, than delve into a study of the faculty of reasoning required for this examination.
Providing next the metaphor on walking, cited above, Lacroix quoted (in italics) Condillac on the limited
effect of theoretical rules in general (305):
38 Lacroix’s arguments (pp. 203–226) stemmed from Condorcet’s critique of Condillac’s erroneous distinction between the
“analytic” methods of algebra, as they came to be called, and the “synthetic” methods of geometry [Baker, 1975, 110–118]. By
convention, analysis assumes the solution of a problem known in unknown terms, while synthesis begins with known principles
and leads to the desired result. Mathematicians of the 18th century often associated analysis with algebra and synthesis with
geometry, but these connections are very unclear; see [Grattan-Guinness, 1990, 135–137; Otte and Panza, 1997; Panteki, 1992,
Section 1.8].
39 For instance, Lacroix advised minimum use of the method of reductio ad absurdum and of memorizing propositions,
stressing, after the PRL, that the ideal teaching of geometry consisted of choosing the right axioms and notions at the exact
point when needed. From among the PRL rules, we mention two: “To let no term be obscure” and “To require as axioms only
what is perfectly evident” (p. 275). He also advised instructors to delve into a comparative study of all existing textbooks on
this subject (pp. 285–291, 302).
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This quote was apparently borrowed from Condillac’s La langue des calculs, which was published
posthumously by the ideologue P. Laromiguère in 1798. In this work, Condillac elaborated on his method
of natural generalization with a view to founding algebra upon arithmetic. This quote originally stems
from Leibniz, as a hint against the frustrating rules of traditional logic.40
Having discussed the limited educational utility of the rules of logic, Lacroix came to question the
priority of geometry over algebra. At first he argued that geometry should be taught first, given that it
hardly required a knowledge of arithmetic and that it fascinated pupils more than algebra (306–307).
However, by next considering geometry as a vehicle for “serious forms of reasoning” (307), he realized
that its study required a certain maturity on the part of the pupil, and thus it should follow the instruction
of algebra. Up to this point, Lacroix had fragmentarily pinpointed a few differences between the two
disciplines by viewing them strictly as objects of instruction. A deep comparative study, which would
take into consideration the conceptual differences that governed the subject matter of those disciplines,
apparently escaped the purposes of his tract, but not the attention of his followers (Section 5.2).
Summing up, in line with the PRL and Euler, Lacroix chose geometry as a paradigmatic model of
rigorous reasoning and attributed to formal logic a secondary, albeit not insignificant role. However, for
all his limited attention to the latter, he does offer us reasons to assume that he did foresee the decline of
that tradition, which, like Condillac, confused formal logic with semiotic epistemology.41
3. Logic in England, 1807–1833
3.1. Kirwan (1807) and Whately (1826)
To Whately is due the title restorer of logical study in England. [De Morgan, 1860b, 247]
In Britain, at the turn of the century, Aristotelian logic was still held in disdain. Commonsense
philosophers retained their admiration for “the logic of Locke,” while intellectuals such as John Horne
Tooke (1736–1812) or Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) conceived logic as universal grammar, in line with
the ideologues.42 Interestingly enough, it was a keen follower of the latter who was the first to argue
against the prevailing view that Locke’s Essay (Section 2.1) constituted an exact system of logic. We
40 See [Leibniz, 1890, 14]. Condillac’s La langue, studied in [Dhombres, 1983], was meant to elucidate elementary algebra,
including the legitimacy of negative numbers. However, his method failed in the solution of algebraic equations of the fifth
degree and it proved to be the least successful of his books [Auroux, 1982, 87]. Warmly recommended to instructors by
De Morgan in 1831a (Section 5.1), this work saw a reprint in 1981.
41 We may see Lacroix’s Essais as an anticipation of [Kirwan, 1807, Section 3.1], since it incorporated the two competing
conceptions of logic that prevailed at the turn of the century, the formal and the facultative, daring to attempt a limited,
comparative study. As stressed by Buickerood [1985, 189], a precise understanding of 18th century logic, conceived as an
analysis of the cognitive faculties, deserves further study. On the development of syllogistic logic during the 18th century, see
[Van Evra, 2000, 115–121].
42 On the stagnation of formal logic in England during the 17th and 18th centuries, see [Dessi, 1988, xvi–xvii; Hamilton,
1833, 194–199; Van Evra, 2000, 116–120]. On Locke’s impact, see [Aarsleff, 1982a; Buickerood, 1985]. On the politician
H. Tooke and the utilitarian philosopher J. Bentham, see [Kretzman, 1967; Rider, 1990, 113–120].
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Logick; or an Essay on the Elements, Principles and Different Modes of Reasoning [Kirwan, 1807].43
Addressed to students of law, Logick stressed the importance of a theoretical study of logic nearly two
decades before the scientific character of formal logic became diffused through Whately’s Elements of
Logic.
Just like Lacroix (Section 2.2), Kirwan acknowledged Locke and Condillac as “excellent metaphysi-
cians,” who, however, had erroneously overlooked the value of syllogism “in legal and theological con-
troversies” [Kirwan, 1807, xi]. Eager to make up for this lacuna, Kirwan not only incorporated the basic
elements of syllogistic logic into his book (467–528), but also argued convincingly on logic’s utility in
directing the mathematician’s attention to the absurdities of algebra (iii–v). Above all, no longer was
logic merely an “art,” as with the PRL or Condillac (Section 2.1), but also existed as a “science,” the
latter term deployed by Kirwan in the sense of a classifying scheme (1–3).
Possibly influenced by Kirwan, Richard Whately (1787–1863), an Oxford graduate in classics and
mathematics in 1808, elaborated on a modern scientific conception of logic in his Elements. A first
version originally appeared in the Encyclopedia Metropolitana in 1823 under the entry “Logic” meeting
little response. However, after its publication in expanded form in 1826, it enjoyed several editions,
forming the starting point for Whately’s successors up to Charles Peirce in the 1860s.44 Whately’s own
starting point was H. Aldrich’s Compendium (1691) on syllogistic logic, which he revised, adding a lucid
account of fallacies, a chapter “On induction,” and other issues related to the “Province of Reasoning.”45
Logic’s “most appropriate office,” claimed Whately, “is that of instituting an analysis of the process
of the mind in Reasoning,” and in this respect, logic is “strictly a Science” [Whately, 1826, 1]. At the
same time he maintained that logic, the “Grammar of Reasoning” (11), is “wholly conversant about
language” (74), a statement apparently contradicting logic’s former definition. His critics hurried to detect
traces of a tradition hostile to Aristotelian logic in Whately’s connections between logic and language.46
But Whately’s focus was on the syllogism, which he viewed from a novel perspective. As pointed out by
Van Evra [2000, 121]:
No longer, however, was the syllogism merely a way of relating propositions within a given language; now it was a specific abstract
thing with a specific role, i.e. to serve as a canonical test of the validity of actual argument, regardless of the language, and regardless
of their (actual) form.
43 Born in Ireland of English descent, Kirwan, a close friend of Tooke, was well versed in linguistics and law [Donovan,
1850]. In his Logick, he drew amply on the PRL, Locke, and the ideologues. According to Hamilton [1833, 204], he was the
“last respectable writer on logic” in Britain before Whately. However, his contributions to the revival of the study of logic were
to be acknowledged but recently; see [Panteki, 1992, Section 6.2; Van Evra, 1984, 9–10].
44 Hamilton accused Whately of not referring to Kirwan as his precursor [Hamilton, 1833, 202–207]. On the impact of the
Elements upon British logicians, see [Panteki, 1993, 341–346; Van Evra, 1984, 14–15]. By 1848 the book saw its ninth edition
in London and New York.
45 On Aldrich’s work, see [Van Evra, 2000, 119–120]. On the content of the Elements, see [Dessi, 1988, xix–xxv; Merrill,
1990, Chapter 1; Van Evra, 1984, 9–14; Van Evra, 2000, 121–122].
46 By stressing connections between logic and language “as an object,” Whately was “introducing semantic ascent to logic,
a concept which would later be firmly established by 20th-century analytic logicians” [Van Evra, 2000, 121, Footnote 31].
Whately’s most severe critics were Hamilton and Solly; see [Hamilton, 1833, 208; Panteki, 1993, 145–146].
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Claiming that just as variables are “arbitrary signs representing numbers in the abstract” (14), he added
that
So also does Logic pronounce on the validity of a regularly constructed argument, equally well, though arbitrary symbols may
have been substituted for the terms. And the possibility of doing this (though the employment of such arbitrary symbols have been
absurdly objected to, even by writers who understand not only Arithmetic but Algebra) is a proof of the strictly scientific character of
the system.
Whately alluded to the Scottish philosopher Dugald Stewart who had objected to the use of literal
symbols in logic [Van Evra, 1984, 11]. Although we lack evidence as to Whately’s mathematical
background, we consider his arguments as congenial to the algebraic speculations of Woodhouse and
Babbage earlier in the century, along with noting that some identical statements were put forward by
Boole in 1848, while trying to explain the function of his logical variables.47
In addition to his lucid account of fallacies [Merrill, 1990, Chapter 1], Whately’s principal contribution
consisted in his defense of logic’s utility in other fields of inquiry and its theoretical importance. He
offered neither any technical innovations, nor even the motivation to extend the limited realms of
traditional syllogistic logic. On the contrary, he was happy to claim that “all arguments may be reduced to
syllogism” (12), and by “all” he also referred to the inductive argument, which he reduced to a syllogism
in Barbara. Whately was aware of the deductive vs inductive opposition that prevailed during the two
previous centuries, with its strong bias in favor of the inductive argument. In his book he meant to show
that this controversy arose from the confusion between induction as an “argument” and as a “research
process.” In the latter case, induction falls outside the provinces of logic, and was thus omitted from his
work [Whately, 1826, Book IV, Chapter 1].
Whately was able to distinguish between logical and physical inquiries. Aware of the fact that the
conclusion of a syllogism is included in the premises, he acknowledged that the discovery of new
truths could not arise from deductive reasoning only. Nonetheless, deductive reasoning—in mathematics
or elsewhere—still plays an important role in our cognitive activities, by helping us to discover
consequences unnoticed until then. His dubious remarks on induction conceived as an implication,
according to recent commentators [Dessi, 1988, xxiv; Van Evra, 1984, 13], attracted the attention of
philosophers of science only after the third edition of the Elements in 1829, which was enriched with an
Appendix that included an analysis of terms related to political economy.
Whately belonged to the so-called group of “Oriel Noetics” at Oxford, who broadly followed along the
lines of D. Ricardo’s (1772–1823) theory of political economy.48 Among the Noetics was the economist
Nassau Senior (1790–1864), who, based upon D. Stewart, insisted upon the axiomatic nature of political
47 On Boole, see [Panteki, 1992, Section 8.2]. Connections between English algebra and logic, from the early 19th century,
have been fragmentarily studied so far. For instance, see [Sherry, 1991] on Woodhouse’s debt to Condillac and [Durand, 1990]
on Peacock’s to Locke. Stewart’s nominalistic impact upon Whately is discussed in [Corsi, 1988, 42–46, 150], a book that also
informs us about the diffusion of Woodhouse’s work on astronomy at Oxford in the early 1820s [Corsi, 1988, 36–48]. However,
Whately’s acquaintance with Woodhouse’s or Babbage’s work is still open to inquiry.
48 In 1829, Whately was appointed Professor of Political Economy, furnishing by 1831 his Introductory Lectures on Political
Economy, with the intention of vindicating the usefulness and scientific nature of this new discipline. On the “Oriel Noetics,”
see [Corsi, 1988, Chapter 7; Dessi, 1988, xxviii; Durand, 2000, 145; Yeo, 1993, 102–111].
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230]:
The foundation of Political Economy being a few general propositions deduced from observation or from consciousness, and generally
admitted as soon as stated, it might have been expected that there would be as little difference of opinion among Political-Economists
as among Mathematicians.
This specific passage, which reflected the premature deductivism of the Ricardians, outraged the
Cambridge group, and especially Whewell (1794–1866) and R. Jones (1799–1855) (Section 3.2).
3.2. The reception of Whately’s elements, 1827–1833
As for Whately and his logic you may neglect him or kick him as you like.49
If Whately be right, Aristotle is fundamentally wrong. [Hamilton, 1833, 231]
Whately’s earliest successor was the botanist George Bentham (1800–1884), nephew of J. Bentham.
Motivated by his uncle’s manuscripts, which were inspired by Condillac’s Logique, Bentham produced
his Outline of a new system of logic [Bentham, 1827], which focused on a critical examination of
Whately’s “last and most improved edition of the Aristotelian system” [Bentham, 1827, viii]. Noting
that Whately had wrongly confined himself to traditional syllogistic, Bentham set off to extend the latter
to account for the subtleties of classification in botany. To this end, he introduced his unique novelty, the
“quantification of the predicate,” thus arriving at an augmented syllogistic scheme of an almost symbolic
form. Bentham’s innovation was to be acknowledged by De Morgan in 1850, too late to bear any impact
whatsoever upon the development of algebraic logic.50
Bentham’s book sold badly, but this cannot account for the neglect shown to its unique novelty since
it featured, together with several new publications inspired by Whately’s Elements, in an anonymous
lengthy review, “Recent Publications on Logical Studies,” which was published in the Edinburgh Review
in 1833. The author of this review was the Scottish philosopher W. Hamilton (1788–1856), who,
after a passing commentary on Bentham’s critique of Whately [Hamilton, 1833, 199–202], focused
exclusively upon Whately’s work. For all his polemic tone, Hamilton admitted that Whately’s Elements
communicated new life “to the expiring study” of logic (199), a fact proved by the eight new publications
on this subject, listed at the opening of his review (194). This apart, Hamilton objected to nearly every
single statement uttered by Whately that deviated from the respectable writings of Aristotle.51
Hamilton accused Whately of lacking historical erudition, arguing at length that the “art-and-science”
distinction of logic was not new with him (201–210). Without approving of Aldrich’s Compendium as a
basis for syllogistic logic (198, 210–213), Hamilton rejected Whately’s links between logic and language,
accusing him of psychologism (208–209). Last but not least, he was opposed to Whately’s embrace of
induction, as inference, within syllogistic logic (224–238). In fact, entering into a comparison between
49 See Whewell’s letter to Jones on 21.12.1832 [Whewell Papers, Add.Ms.c.51/149].
50 See [De Morgan, 1850, 32]. On Bentham’s syllogistic scheme, see [Panteki, 1993, 141–143; Styazhkin, 1969, 148–150;
Van Evra, 1992]. On the quantification of the predicate see Footnote 9.
51 On Hamilton’s review, see [Dessi, 1988, xxv–xxviii; Van Evra, 1984, 14–15]. In a passage where Kant was mentioned as
the next eminent authority on logic after Aristotle, Hamilton claimed, “Logic is a formal science” (215). See also Footnote 26.
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then Aristotle was wrong (212, 231).
While Hamilton criticized Whately’s work from the point of view of formal, deductive logic, Whewell
examined it from a diametrically opposed standpoint, that of inductive logic, which underlay his notion of
science. Whewell referred in print to Whately’s work in his Bridgewater treatise on Astronomy published
the same year as Hamilton’s review. Distinguishing between the inductive and deductive modes of
thinking, Whewell claimed that these two modes entailed different moral and religious attitudes. Kepler
and Newton were the inductive discoverers, while Lagrange or Laplace the mathematical talents, who,
unlike the former, were not religiously inspired by their science. He openly downgraded the role of both
mathematics and logic, using Whately for his purpose, by holding that:
[. . .] all which mathematics or logic can do, is to develop and extract those truths, as conclusions, which were in reality involved in
the principles on which our reasoning proceeded.*
*
“Since all reasoning may be resolved into syllogisms, and since in a syllogism the premises do virtually assert the conclusions,
it follows at once, that no new truth can be elicited by any process of reasoning.” Whately’s Logic, p. 223.52
Whewell’s polemic against Whately began in 1831, when his close friend Jones quoted in a letter
to him Senior’s passage on political economy (Section 3.1), as appended in the third edition of the
Elements.53 According to Whewell and Jones, by supporting Ricardian political economy, the Oriel
Noetics wrongly neglected the virtues of induction and the laborious but sure process of ascending
from observation to general first principles. The crux of the controversy concerned the notion of the
nature of science. Whewell looked down at advocators of the deductive mode of reasoning, calling them
“Downward road” people. Whately, in particular, by embracing induction within syllogistic logic, was
seen as a severe threat to Whewell’s and Jones’ attempt to explain the nature of the inductive method to
the public.54
As a matter of fact, Whewell and Jones became engaged with the nature of science around 1822. In
1826, Whewell declared his intention to deliver “grand lectures on the principles of induction in mixed
mathematics” [Todhunter, 1876, II, 71–72], but his plans were postponed until the early 1830s. He was
motivated to make his views known on this issue by undertaking to review Herschel’s Discourse on
natural philosophy (1830) and Jones’ Essay on the distribution of wealth (1831), as well as by revising
his treatises on mechanics.55 By that time, De Morgan had recommended the Elements in his educational
booklet [De Morgan, 1831a, 71, fn.; Section 5.3], citing the third edition of Whately’s book.
52 [Whewell, 1833, 335–336]. The asterisks denote the footnote, here appended after the text. On Astronomy and the
inductive–deductive distinction, see [Becher, 1991; Richards, 1992, 57–62; Yeo, 1993, 116–124].
53 See Jones’s letter to Whewell on 24.2.1831 [Whewell Papers, Add.Ms.c.52/20]. On Whewell’s replies, which amounted to
the claim that “The analogy between physical and political or economical sciences is yet to be shown,” see [Todhunter, 1876,
II, 115–124]. These letters reveal that their sole objection to Whately’s logic concerned his embrace of the inductive argument
within syllogistic, deductive logic.
54 As Whewell wrote to Jones in July 1831: “If you will give me illustrations and examples of the ascending method applied to
moral sciences we shall have no difficulty in fighting the ‘downward road’ people” [Todhunter, 1876, II, 125]. On the Oxford–
Cambridge controversy, see [Corsi, 1988, 150–158; Yeo, 1993, 12, 93, 102–105].
55 In the early 1820s, Whewell and Jones talked about the “metaphysics” of science, a notion that gradually developed into
what Whewell called in 1837 the “logic of induction.” On his reviews and textbooks (Section 6.1), see [Corsi, 1988, 150–158;
Richards, 1980, 351–359; Todhunter, 1876, I, 52–57; Yeo, 1993, 21, 93–99].
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4.0. Preface
Thank heaven that I was at Cambridge in the interval between two systems, when thought about both was in the order of the day
even among undergraduates. There are pairs of men alive who did each other more good by discussing x over dx and Newton versus
Laplace, than all the private tutors ever do.56
De Morgan entered Trinity College in February 1823. In 1826, he sat for the strenuous pre-Tripos
“disputations,” which concerned “Newton’s first section, Lagrange’s derived functions, and Locke on
innate principles” [De Morgan, 1872, 305], graduating a fourth wrangler in January 1827.57 In charge
of the Tripos58 were the “examiners” and the “moderators,” the latter ranking higher than the former.
The moderators were responsible for moderating the discussion involved in the students’ disputations,
for evaluating the classification of wranglers, and above all for posing original problems in the Tripos.
Privileged, as they were, with these duties, they had a powerful role in potentially influencing the
educational system at Cambridge, as De Morgan would note in 1832:
The moderators, or examiners, who are usually younger masters of arts, and come to the matter with the newest ideas going, feel
that great scope is allowed, and do not confine themselves to any book or system, further than may appear advisable to themselves.
Hence any great improvement is of comparatively easy introduction, it only needs one moderator, who does not fear the appearance
of singularity.59
Such a moderator was George Peacock, co-founder of the Analytical Society in 1812 with Charles
Babbage and John F. Herschel [Enros, 1983]. Due to his efforts regarding the Tripos of 1817 and 1819,
Newton’s long-standing fluxional calculus was replaced by the differential calculus. However, when
De Morgan began his studies, “the old system was still remembered and discussed, and excited much
thought about fundamental principles to the great advantage of many” [De Morgan, 1865, 146]. The
period of his studies was additionally marked by changes in the teaching of mechanics. Thanks to his
tutor, William Whewell, students became acquainted with the name of Laplace, and were interestingly
induced to discuss the latter’s Mécanique céleste versus Newton’s old-fashioned Principia. As he wrote
in his letter to Whewell in 1861—quoted above—De Morgan considered it a great privilege to have
been at Cambridge during such an “interval between two systems,” an interval of an enduring impact
upon his career. Impressed by the force of his arguments in that letter, we offer an overview of the state
of mathematics (Section 4.1) and mechanics (Section 4.2) at Cambridge during the period 1817–1827,
prior to stressing the role of his Cambridge education and his potential as a graduate (Section 4.3).
56 From De Morgan’s letter to Whewell on 20.1.1861, quoted in [S. De Morgan, 1882, 305–306]. Apparently due to a misprint,
a dot is missing from x, to denote a fluxion.
57 Dating back to the Middle Ages, the disputations would be abolished in 1839. Based upon De Morgan’s own notebooks as
a student, [Rice, 1997b, 20–28] offers a detailed account of his student years and graduation exams.
58 The name “Tripos” originated in the 15th century when, prior to receiving their degree, undergraduates went through an
oral examination, seated upon a three-legged stool, known as a tripos; see [Becher, 1980b, 1–6; Becher, 1995, 414, 423; Rice,
1997b, 20–24].
59 The quotation is from [De Morgan, 1832b, 276], his first review of a Cambridge textbook, namely J. Wood’s elementary
Algebra (Section 6.2).
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The preceding pages have been devoted to a slight account of the history and present state of Analytical Science, that branch of human
knowledge, of which Laplace has justly observed “C’est le guide le plus sur qui peut nous conduire dans la recherche de la verite.”60
[Babbage and Herschel, 1813, xxi]
This statement is from the Preface to the Memoirs of the Analytical Society, for the year 1813, the
unique volume of the journal published anonymously by the Analytical Society (AS) in 1813. The
Preface was written by Babbage in close collaboration with Herschel, while the main part of the Memoirs
consisted of their own original contributions, in line with the work produced by leading mathematicians
in France at the turn of the century.61 The Preface opened with an appraisal of the language of analysis,
as shaped and perfected by Lagrange, Laplace, and Arbogast. There followed a summary of recent
work produced in the realm of differential, finite difference, and functional equations, with special
attention to “Lagrange’s theorem” and Laplace’s “method of generating functions,” both characterized
by a singular analogy between indices of repeated functional operations and exponents. Magnetized by
the “peculiar grace of Laplace’s Analysis” (v), the two authors paid tribute to his contributions in the
field of probabilities (xii) and celestial mechanics (xvi). But, besides an astonishing erudition on the state
of Continental mathematics and mechanics, the volume of Memoirs above all reflected the dreams of
its authors of fostering mathematical research in England, by promoting what they conceived as “pure”
mathematics over the so-called “mixed” or “applied” or “synthetic” mathematics that had prevailed since
Newton’s time.
The mathematical curriculum at Cambridge in the 1800s focused on Euclidean geometry and
Newtonian fluxions, optics, mechanics, and astronomy [Becher, 1980b, 1–10]; in other words,
mathematics that involved geometrical reasoning and was closely linked with intuition and physical
concepts. These stood in sharp contrast to Lagrange’s “analytics,” that is, methods stemming from
his algebraic calculus, founded upon power-series expansions. Devoid of diagrams, limits and physical
concepts, which underlay “synthetic” mathematics, Lagrange’s analytics were privileged with a powerful
symbolic language, which afforded economical storage of knowledge and the ability to generalize, thus
potentially leading to new discoveries.62
According to Lagrange, every function f (x + h) could be expanded in a Taylor series,
(4.1.1)f (x + h)= f (x)+ ph+ p′h2 + p′′h3 + · · · ,
where the symbols p, p′, p′′, etc. were new functions of x “derived” from f in a certain algebraic
manner. Through suitable transformations and by comparing the resulting expansions, Lagrange arrived
60
“It is the most certain guide which can lead us in the search for truth.” Quoted without an accent, Laplace’s exact statement
has not been traced. However, similar statements can be found in his 1795 lectures (Section 2), or in subsequent writings, such
as his treatise on “Probabilities” of 1812, cited in Memoirs (p. xii).
61 On the anonymity and scope of this volume, as well as the papers contributed to it by Babbage and Herschel, see [Enros,
1979, Chapter 4; Panteki, 1992, Section 2.3]. On the drawbacks of its printing, see [Topham, 2000]. The significance of the
Preface to the Memoirs is raised by numerous historians; see [Ashworth, 1996, 653; Koppelman, 1971, 181–184].
62 On the state of mathematical studies at Cambridge in the 1800s, and the alleged distinction between “analytics” and
“synthetics,” see [Ashworth, 1996, 632–636; Becher, 1980b, 1–10; Becher, 1995, 405–407; Enros, 1981; Enros, 1983] and
Footnote 38.
M. Panteki / Historia Mathematica 30 (2003) 278–340 297by induction from (4.1.1) at the formula
(4.1.2)f (x + h)= f (x)+ hf ′(x)+ h
2
2! f
′′(x)+ · · · ,
where f ′(x) stood for df (x)/dx, f ′′(x) for d2f (x)/dx2, etc. Based next upon the analogy between
indices of operation, as in d2f (x), and exponents, as in (df (x))2 (an analogy noted earlier by Leibniz),
Lagrange cast (4.1.2) in the symbolic form
(4.1.3)f (x)= f (x + h)− f (x)= exp(hdf (x)/dx)− 1,
which he would generalize for the nth finite difference of f (x). Named after him, this symbolic version
of Taylor’s theorem proved useful in problems of interpolation and summation (when n attained negative
values), leading ultimately to Laplace’s method of generating functions in the 1770s.63
Eager to provide an alternative proof for Lagrange’s theorem, L.F. Arbogast furnished his intricate
“Calculus of derivations” in his treatise [Arbogast, 1800]. While his actual calculus of derivations had
very few followers (among them De Morgan),64 the epistemological basis of his treatise had an immense
impact upon the development of the calculus of operations, offering an explicit distinction between
“operation” and “function.” In a spirit congenial to Condillac and Laplace, Arbogast paid significant
attention to the language of analysis, claiming that “The secret of the power of Analysis consists in the
happy choice and application of signs, which are simple and characteristic of the things they should
represent” [Arbogast, 1800, ii]. Elaborating over this dictum, Arbogast introduced the “separation of the
scale of operation” as follows [Arbogast, 1800, viii–ix]:
This method is generally thought of as separating from the functions of variables when possible, the operational signs which affect
this function. Then of treating the expressions formed by these signs applied to any quantity whatsoever, an expression, which I have
called a scale of operation, to treat it, I say, nevertheless as if the operational signs which compose it were quantities, then to multiply
the result by the function.
After deploying combinatorial techniques in order to prove the formula (4.1.3), Arbogast separated the
symbols of operation, like d/dx, from those of quantity, like f (x), in order to obtain the purely symbolic
form of Lagrange’s theorem,
(4.1.4)= exp(hD)− 1, where D = d/dx,
thus giving rise to a study of symbolical methods, whose rigorous foundation was sought after by F.J.
Français, F.J. Servois, and others from the mid-1810s onwards.65
At Cambridge, Lagrange’s algebraic calculus attracted the attention of Robert Woodhouse, a precursor
of the AS. In his Principles of Analytical Calculations (1803), Woodhouse discussed the merits and
63 On Lagrange’s theory of derived functions, see [Grattan-Guinness, 1990, 129, 161, 195–203]. On the generalization of
formula (4.1.3) and its impact upon Laplace and Arbogast, see [Panteki, 1992, Chapter 1] and Footnote 33.
64 On Arbogast’s calculus of derivations, see [Grattan-Guinness, 1990, 211–216]. Very few English mathematicians developed
this calculus, among them J. West, A. Cayley, and S. Roberts, mentioned in [Panteki, 1992, Chapter 5]. On De Morgan’s
moderate development of Arbogast’s calculus, see [De Morgan, 1842, 168–174].
65 Upon the development of algebraic, symbolical methods in France and England, after Arbogast, see [Koppelman, 1971;
Panteki, 1992]. Français’ and Servois’ foundational studies became known after R. Murphy’s and D.F. Gregory’s contributions
in the 1830s; see [Allaire, 2002; Panteki, 1993, 136–140; Panteki, 2000, 369–178].
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definition of “=” as a link between a function and its expansion, in order to overcome problems of
convergence. Although Woodhouse’s attempt for a reform at Cambridge failed at the time, his book,
along with Lacroix’s big treatise on the calculus, served as a starting point for the members of the AS in
1811–1812.66
Herschel launched his research in 1813 with a study of functional equations, treated through an
extension of Laplace’s method of finite differences. Thereafter, he focused on a combination of the
calculus of differences with the calculus of operations, as stemming from Arbogast’s method of
separation of symbols, while Babbage directed all his energy toward functional equations. Whereas
the two friends shared a common passion for analytics, they had distinct preferences as to the specific
methods they followed in their papers. For instance, Babbage deployed Monge’s algebraic techniques
instead of Laplace’s method of finite differences, moreover refusing to apply Arbogast’s symbolic
approach. However, Babbage’s freewheeling manipulation of iterated functions, such as ff = f 2, which
betrayed the nature of his algorithmic reasoning, practiced later on in computing, stemmed largely from
Arbogast’s impact upon Herschel. As it were, many of Herschel’s novelties in foundations or notational
issues were hidden for the most part in the voluminous correspondence between the two friends, which
continued ceaselessly from 1812 to 1820.67
By 1820 both Babbage and Herschel had left Cambridge, after realizing that their project of fostering
the study of analytics had largely failed. To Babbage’s dismay, the papers they had contributed to the
Memoirs had not been reviewed in any British journal [Enros, 1983, 37]. Moreover, their subsequent
publications received negative reviews, apparently from P. Barlow, teacher in the Military Academy of
Woolwich [Enros, 1979, 170–193]. The spirit of their research and professionalization of mathematics
at large were foreign to Cambridge’s “Liberal education,” according to which most graduates, including
the members of the AS, sought careers elsewhere.68 But even for those who did stay, such as Peacock,
the methods developed by Babbage and Herschel seemed too abstract and general to be assimilated, let
alone form part of the curriculum.
Peacock’s opposition to their views was evident in the two common contributions of the AS, the
translation of Lacroix’s abridged textbook on the calculus, published as [Lacroix, 1816], and its sequel
of Examples [Babbage et al., 1820]. After Peacock, Lacroix [1816] opened with a limit concept, quite
in line with the traditional, intuitive approach at Cambridge.69 Moreover, the main part of the Examples
66 On the formation of the AS around 1812, see [Enros, 1983]. Woodhouse’s textbooks are discussed in [Becher, 1980b, 8–10].
On his early algebraic concerns, see especially [Becher, 1980a; Dubbey, 1978, Chapter 5; Sherry, 1991]. The latter argues about
Condillac’s plausible impact upon Woodhouse, while the two former hint at Woodhouse’s impact upon Babbage’s manuscripts
on the “Philosophy of analysis” produced in the early 1820s, serving as a stimulus for [Peacock, 1830].
67 On Babbage’s and Herschel’s distinct contributions to analytics, see respectively [Grattan-Guinness, 1992a, 1992b]. On
a detailed study of their investigations, largely based upon their correspondence, see [Panteki, 1992, Chapter 2]. On a novel
perspective as to the mechanization of thought entailed in their work, to which Whewell would be strongly opposed, see
[Ashworth, 1996].
68 In Whewell’s own words, Cambridge graduates were future “lawyers, or men of business, or statesmen” [Whewell,
1835, 40]. On the lack of public institutional encouragement for mathematical sciences in England, see [Ashworth, 1996;
Becher, 1980b, 1–10; Becher, 1995; Enros, 1981; Garland, 1980, Chapter 3].
69 Most Cambridge mathematicians endorsed the intuition-based limit concept in the calculus; see [Fisch, 1999; Richards,
1991, 1992; Smith, 1980, 1984b]. On the social, philosophical, and religious factors that differentiated Peacock from Babbage
and Herschel, see [Becher, 1995].
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Tripos Euler’s version of the calculus, not Lagrange’s theory of derived functions.70 With Peacock, the
textbooks of the AS hardly revolutionized the curriculum, but were seen to fit into it. The marginalization
of Babbage’s and Herschel’s aspirations would become even more striking with Whewell’s intervention
in the 1820s!
4.2. Whewell between Newton and Laplace
Instead of balancing the simplicity and evidence of the mathematics of a century ago against the generality and rapidity of modern
analysis, it might be better to attempt to combine them. [Whewell, 1823, vi]
For all his lack of enthusiasm for abstract analytics, Peacock did enrich the Tripos with infinite series
and differential equations, moderately expanding the curriculum in the late 1810s. However, the Tripos
would soon undergo new changes, indicative of Whewell’s peculiar tendency to combine 18th century
mathematics with “modern analysis,” as he stated in his above-quoted treatise on Dynamics [Whewell,
1823]. Due to Whewell’s efforts, more questions on mixed mathematics appeared in the Tripos during
the 1820s, along with problems of mechanics and physics which required two distinct types of solution:
one based upon geometrico-physical reasoning, and another based on analysis.71
Whewell matriculated at Trinity in 1812 but never became a member of the AS, nor did he participate
in its textbook publications.72 In 1818 he became assistant mathematics tutor, and in 1823 he was head
tutor at Trinity, engaged ambitiously with his plan to update the teaching of mechanics. Whewell’s plan
was far from congenial with the spirit of the textbooks produced by the AS and saw that they gained as
limited an audience as possible. [Lacroix, 1816] was initially intended to be taught prior to mechanics.
Thus, the students would assume a sound foundation of the calculus and learn to think in the abstract,
able to proceed from general propositions to specific applications. However, according to Whewell, the
student ought to move in the opposite direction, that is, from specific examples to general theories.
Moreover, only the best students would be encouraged to proceed with the advanced material of modern
analysis, which was incorporated into [Lacroix, 1816] and its sequel [Becher, 1980b, 32–34].
Upon these grounds, he first produced an Elementary Treatise on Mechanics [Whewell, 1819],
designed so that the students could learn a considerable portion of mechanics before learning the calculus.
Opposed to Lagrange’s formalism in Mécanique analytique (1788), Whewell deployed geometrical
diagrams and limits, thus presenting mechanics “as a series of distinct individual constructions, each
with its own proof, rather than a series of deductions from general principles” [Becher, 1980b, 16].
70 Indeed, 507 pages of the Examples were devoted to Peacock’s calculus, 127 covered Herschel’s calculus of finite
differences, and only 42 corresponded to Babbage’s functional equations. Read by De Morgan as a student, this work would
have significant impact upon the revival of the calculus of operations, along Arbogast’s and Herschel’s lines in the late 1830s
(see [Panteki, 1992, Chapter 4; Panteki, 2000, 169–178]). On Peacock’s efforts as a moderator in the late 1810s, see [Becher,
1995].
71 Certain problems required only a geometrical solution (see [Cambridge, 1831, 36, 108]), while others required both
geometrical and analytical solutions (see [Cambridge, 1831, 139, 144]). Forming a par excellence characteristic of the 1820s,
this tendency diminished in the 1830s. Details on the type of problems posed at the Tripos at that time are included in [Panteki,
1992, Section 3.2].
72 As stressed in [Becher, 1991, 1–2], numerous errors have been committed by historians concerning Whewell’s alleged
involvement with the AS. In this paper, the author presents a summary of Whewell’s multidimensional personality and career.
Thereafter we draw amply on [Becher, 1980b], who provides a step-by-step analysis of Whewell’s controversial attitude in
connection with the mathematics education at Cambridge for nearly half a century.
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than Lagrange’s, which manifested its author’s predilection for applications, not foundations.73
It took long for Laplace’s MC to be introduced at Cambridge University, although various reforms took
place in Scotland and Ireland under its stimulus, thanks to individuals like James Ivory and John Brinkley,
respectively, well before the foundation of the AS.74 The lack of public institutional encouragement
for the mathematical sciences in England, and particularly the conservatism that ruled Cambridge’s
adherence to Newton’s Principia, were at the core of John Playfair’s review of MC in 1808 at Edinburgh
University. In defense of Laplace’s treatise, Playfair argued that not only was it not “threatening religion,”
but that on the contrary it reinforced both “the thesis of the existence of an initial design” and “the
Aristotelian doctrine of final causes.”75 Playfair’s “admirable review” was acknowledged in the Memoirs
(ii), but noting that their own business was “exclusively with pure Analytics,” Babbage and Herschel
focused on the latter,76 letting Woodhouse take the first step toward the diffusion of MC at Cambridge.
Woodhouse furnished an advanced treatise on Physical Astronomy [Woodhouse, 1818], which he
enriched with a comprehensive historical account, still worthy of attention. Referring with praise to
Laplace’s treatment of the three-body problem, he declared the “superiority of the Analytical over
the Geometrical method” (lix), proceeding with an elaborate study of the orbital differential equation,
indispensable for the study of planetary mechanics. In so doing, he introduced into the curriculum the
method of variation of constants, an issue favored by certain moderators from 1820 onwards.77 As it were,
without incorporating Laplace’s theory of the earth’s shape, Woodhouse’s treatise was nearly the only
textbook on physical astronomy to include instances from Laplace’s original procedures until J.H. Pratt’s
Mechanical philosophy in 1836 (Section 6.1).
In 1823, Whewell furnished his treatise on Dynamics [Whewell, 1823], as a sequel to his former
textbook of 1819, calling students to orient their studies toward a simplification of Laplace’s work
[Whewell, 1823, v]:
73 Even by a quick glance at the two treatises on mechanics, the reader can see the radically different styles of the two
relatively similar analytizations of mechanics. Lagrange’s treatise is more lucid, formal, and general than Laplace’s, focusing
on the symmetry of its formulae and avoiding any appeal to intuition. On the other hand, Laplace provides an accumulation of
observational and experimental data and omits explanation of his often approximate procedures, eager to show that his solution
is confirmed in practice, by replacing the variables with specific values, rather than provide any idea of how he arrived at it in
the first place. Some similarities and differences can be found in [Panteki, 1992, Chapter 1]. On a larger scale, see [Grattan-
Guinness, 1990, Chapter 5]. On Laplace’s MC, see also Footnote 36.
74 On Ivory, see [Craik, 2000]. On the reforms that took place in Scotland and Ireland, prior to the AS, see [Guicciardini,
1989, Chapters 7–9; Panteki, 1987]. Particularly on Ivory’s original research into Laplace’s potential theory and Brinkley’s on
analytics, with which Babbage and Herschel were familiar, see [Panteki, 1992, Section 2.1].
75 From Playfair’s review, partly quoted in [Durand, 2000, 142]. On the influence of religion upon the administrative and
educational system at Cambridge, see [Becher, 1995; Richards, 1992]. Particularly on the contrasts between Edinburgh and
Cambridge University at the time, see [Ashworth, 1996, 639–641; Enros, 1981, 136–140].
76 We wish to note, however, that by 1813 Herschel was seriously engaged with the study of MC, and in the Memoirs, page
xvi was devoted to an extract from this work, concerning the problem of decomposition of forces, which was reduced to a
functional equation (see [Panteki, 1992, Section 1.4]). Moreover, plausible applications of their theoretical studies were not
omitted from Babbage’s and Herschel’s projects. As Babbage held in his second paper on functional equations, his calculus
would soon develop into a powerful tool for physical discoveries [Babbage, 1816, 179–180].
77 See particularly [Woodhouse, 1818, 23, 92–105, 140, 208–211, 271, 400–406]. Instances drawn from his book would
form part of the questions posed in the Tripos (see [Cambridge, 1831, 10, 16, 78, 139, 142, 162–164, 171–172; Panteki, 1992,
Section 3.2]).
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the Mecanique Celeste, as the ulterior subject of his labours; and those who shall simplify the different parts of that work, and reduce
them to the level of ordinary readers, as far as they admit it, deserve to be considered as real benefactors to the commonwealth of
science.
But that was as far as he went. By failing to include segments of Laplace’s MC and to draw the
students’ attention to a full exposition of the three-body problem, Dynamics was definitely a retreat from
Woodhouse’s Astronomy. And even Airy’s Mathematical Tracts [Airy, 1826], which included new issues
such as the theory of the earth’s shape, was in many ways inferior to Woodhouse’s treatise, curiously
omitting the method of variation of constants and promoting instead only approximate techniques for the
solution of differential equations.78
A disciple of Whewell, and senior wrangler in 1823, G.B. Airy was a far better mathematician than
Whewell and a promising astronomer, involved with research on planetary inequalities along Laplace’s
lines. However, reluctantly following Whewell’s suggestions, Airy presented the theory of the earth’s
shape in accordance with Clairaut’s semigeometrical, semianalytical style, based on the 18th century
theory of hydrodynamics, instead of Laplace’s potential theory. Airy’s inadequate explanations and above
all his unorthodox combination of “synthetics” and “analytics” would puzzle generations of students
(Section 6.1). However, the Tracts were in full accordance with Whewell’s demands, who not only
endorsed Airy’s book with enthusiasm, but even objected later on to Airy’s suggestions to update it.79
Whewell’s peculiar oscillation between Newton and Laplace, or between tradition and progress,
was evident not only in his textbooks and lectures. In his own papers, read for the Cambridge
Philosophical Society in the 1820s, he deployed geometrical methods, elementary algebra, trigonometry,
differentiation, and approximate techniques for the solution of differential equations, looking for
simplicity and close contact with physical concepts. As a typical mixed mathematician, he was concerned
with answers, not abstract rigor, and upon these grounds he would deploy, if necessary, even divergent
series [Becher, 1980b, 16–18]. In 1826 he produced an article “On the Mathematical Theory of Electricity
Compared with Experiment,” published in Encyclopedia Metropolitana in 1830. Orientated towards
applications, [Whewell, 1830] focused on the mathematical properties of what became known after
Whewell as “Laplace coefficients” (now Legendre functions), implicitly promoting a branch of pure
analytics, which would have a decisive impact upon the development of algebraic symbolical methods in
the 1830s.80
4.3. De Morgan’s mentors
We have, in practice, a system, which gives true results; and, to use the words of a writer to whose Analytical Calculations elective
affinity led me when I was an elementary student, “Since it leads to truth, it must have a logic.” [De Morgan, 1865, 179]
78 Like [Whewell, 1823, 75], Airy acknowledged Woodhouse’s “superior” treatment of the three-body problem, which he
omitted from his account. Moreover, he merely mentioned the orbital equation, putting forward, however, only approximate
techniques for its solution [Airy, 1826, iv, 1–5, 27]. On Airy’s Tracts, see further [Becher, 1980b, 26, 32–34; Panteki, 2000,
169–174], in connection with his inadequate treatment of the earth-figure equation, a problem favored by Tripos moderators.
79 See Whewell’s letter to Airy on 11 October 1839, fully quoted in [Todhunter, 1876, II, 282].
80 On Whewell’s article, published anonymously, see [Becher, 1980b, 18; Todhunter, 1876, I, 84–85]. On its impact, see
[Panteki, 2000, 170–173, 202].
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of his career. According to his wife’s Memoir [S. De Morgan, 1882, 15–16]:
He never forgot what he owed to his teachers in the University. These were, as entered in his own book, his college tutor J.P. Higman,
Archdeacon Thorp, G.B. Airy, A. Coddington, H. Parr Hamilton (Dean of Salisbury), G. Peacock (Dean of Ely), and W. Whewell
(afterwards Master of Trinity). With all these gentlemen he kept up a friendship and correspondence during their joint lives.
To these men we could add Woodhouse (alluded to in our opening quote), Babbage, and Herschel, with
whom at this stage De Morgan was acquainted but through the perusal of their textbooks.81 Beginning
with Woodhouse, the very title and content of De Morgan’s paper “On infinity and the sign of equality”
[De Morgan, 1865], cited above, was highly congenial with the former’s research back in 1803.82 In
the same paper, he paid tribute to Peacock, as “a friend whom I so highly value, and to whose thought
I have been so much indebted” [De Morgan, 1865, 180]. If, moreover, we consider his essay on the
“Calculus of functions” (COF) [De Morgan, 1836], we have sufficient evidence for supporting the view
that De Morgan was a genuine, perhaps the only genuine, follower of all precursors and founders of the
AS.83
Indeed, in his essay on the COF, De Morgan drew on all the papers furnished by Babbage and
Herschel on functional equations, including those incorporated in the obscure volume of the Memoirs
[Panteki, 1992, Sections 3.5–3.9]. Moreover, he was shrewd to perceive the immense historical value of
this volume, which has remained basically unread to this day, by writing on his own copy of it in 1858:
The time will come, when this work will be sought after by the curious, as the earliest indication of the change, which was taking
place in English mathematics. I think it is all written by Herschel and Babbage: the preface by Herschel. No more was published
under this name.84
Furthermore, [De Morgan, 1836] manifests his historical orientation, which underlay the majority of
his educational, mathematical, and logical writings. As we shall see, this inclination was partly due
to Lacroix’s influence. However, many of his mentors at Cambridge might have provided him with
additional stimuli for the study and use of the history of science. For instance, in 1826 Peacock composed
a lengthy article on “Arithmetic” published in Encyclopedia Metropolitana in 1830, while the textbooks
and lectures of Woodhouse, Whewell, and Airy contained historical comments on physical astronomy.
81 On De Morgan’s tutors and his study of the textbooks issued by the AS, see [Rice, 1997b, 24–27, 30–33, 50–52]. Most of
his tutors wrote excellent testimonial letters for his appointment at London university in 1828; see [S. De Morgan, 1882, 14–17;
Rice, 1997a].
82 On [De Morgan, 1865], see [S. De Morgan, 1882, 328–331; Panteki, 1992, Section 3.9; Richards, 1987, 28–29] and
Section 1.1. On Woodhouse’s definition of equality, see [Becher, 1980a] and Section 4.1.
83 According to [Richards, 1987, 10], De Morgan can be viewed as a “satellite” of the AS. We further support her claim with
what follows below in text.
84 London University Library, L3 [Anal. Soc.]. Until [Enros, 1979], De Morgan appears to have been the only mathematician
to have delved into the contents of this journal. It may be worth noting that Whewell referred to the Memoirs in the British
Critic in 1831 as a meaningless “combination of signs” of “extraordinary complexity” (see [Enros, 1983, 37]). Although we
know from their correspondence that Babbage undertook to write the Preface, still De Morgan’s remark is far from surprising,
given the fact that many of the comments concerning French publications actually derived from Herschel, who followed along
the lines defined by them in the Memoirs more closely than Babbage [Panteki, 1992, Chapter 2].
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orbits of the moon and the comets published in 1833. But De Morgan was not gifted with enough patience
to carry out the lengthy numerical calculations involved in this branch. As he confided to Whewell in
1832: “but by the powers of calculating and the properties of numbers, I protest, I will never work out
a planetary perturbation, or the place of a comet, and much obliged do I feel to those who can and will
do such things,” alluding to Airy, who had just received a medal from the Royal Astronomical Society
(RAS) for his paper on planetary inequalities.85 However, by being himself a member of the RAS from
1830 onwards, De Morgan cultivated his passion for astronomy, contributing numerous historical articles
[Rice, 1996].
Mechanics and astronomy in fact seem to have been among De Morgan’s principal interests during his
residence at Cambridge. The recent discovery of a tract he wrote in 1827 on “Statics” reveals Whewell’s
influence toward the study of celestial mechanics, through both his Dynamics in 1823 and his article
on “Electricity,” which De Morgan read in manuscript in 1826 [Becher, 1980b, 18, Footnote 68]. As
it were, De Morgan composed his manuscript on “Statics” with the intention of producing a sequel
on dynamics, ultimately providing the students with a complete course ranging from first principles to
Laplace’s physical astronomy [Rice, 1997b, 53–54]. De Morgan had good reasons for planning such a
project, given the rather confusing presentation of mechanics’ principles by Whewell and Airy through
a combination of old-fashioned synthetic mathematics and modern analysis (Section 4.2). However, he
never completed the first treatise, and as a result its sequel was never composed either. Notwithstanding
the reasons that impeded the publication of De Morgan’s tract, it merits attention upon the grounds that
it formed the main testimonial for his election at London University in 1828.86
De Morgan’s tract of 1827 is our earliest evidence of his ability to critically assimilate and combine
diverse mathematical and epistemological stimuli, manifesting his enduring interest in the foundations
of pure and applied mathematics as well as his talent for teaching. It further justifies his wife’s claim
that he devoted much time to extensive reading as a student “beyond the bounds marked by his tutors”
[S. De Morgan, 1882, 15]. Indeed, in it he deployed functional equations, such as
(4.3.1)f (x + h)+ f (x − y)= f (x) · f (y),
which were absent from Babbage’s and Herschel’s work, while he also drew on Lagrange’s principle of
virtual velocities, which Whewell had objected to using in his own treatises.87 Above all, the existence of
this tract in the framework of what appears to be a branch of applied mathematics induces us to reexamine
certain of his subsequent contributions to education, algebra, the calculus, and logic.
De Morgan never came to produce a textbook on mechanics, nor any research work on celestial
mechanics. He was largely attentive, however, to issues concerning the first principles of applied
mathematics. In 1832, he furnished his elementary Calculus [De Morgan, 1832a, 133], designed for
use prior to the students’ initiation to mechanics. He also produced a Spherical Trigonometry in 1834,
85 From De Morgan’s letter to Whewell on 12.11.1832 [Whewell Papers, Add.Ms.a.202/96]. That year, Airy was awarded a
medal from the RAS for his paper on planetary inequalities [Rice, 1997b, 103].
86 On De Morgan’s election, see [Rice, 1997a] and on his tract [Rice, 1997a, 270–271].
87 On Whewell’s objection to Lagrange’s principles, see [Becher, 1980b, 15–16]. On Eq. (4.3.1), see Chapter 2 of the
“Elements of Statics,” University College Library, MS.Add.27; cited as [De Morgan, 1827]. De Morgan treated this functional
equation using Lagrange’s method of developing f (x + h) in Taylor series. On this rarely used method, see [De Morgan, 1836,
328, 367].
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188–193]. Moreover, we note that part of De Morgan’s fame was due to his contributions in the field of
probabilities.88 To this end, he devoted a section of his advanced Calculus [De Morgan, 1842, 331–340,
746–749] to Laplace’s method of generating functions, an issue closely linked to the latter’s work on
probabilities. Last, but not least, almost half his review of Peacock’s Algebra in 1835 was a critical
overview of the teaching of mechanics at Cambridge, which culminated in raising interesting links
between mechanics, the calculus, algebra, and logic (Section 6.2).
As we saw, De Morgan was in many ways a faithful disciple of Woodhouse, Peacock, Babbage,
Herschel, Whewell, and Airy, while the majority of his tutors stimulated his longstanding interest in
the foundations of the calculus.89 By drawing additionally on the original works of Arbogast, Lagrange,
Laplace, and others, he deviated largely from “the bounds marked” by his mentors at Cambridge, as his
wife rightly claimed in her Memoirs. Before we proceed to illustrate his debt to the encyclopedist Lacroix,
we should add a note concerning his earliest mentor, while at school, his teacher J. Parsons. A former
fellow of Oriel College, Oxford, Parsons was a close friend of Whately’s, talking of him perpetually to
his pupils. As De Morgan wrote in his Paradoxes: “Before I was sixteen, and before Whately had even
given his Bampton lectures, I was very familiar with his name and some of his sayings” [De Morgan,
1872, 196]. Although Whately would have his “Logic” published in Encyclopedia Metropolitana the very
year De Morgan matriculated at Trinity, it is quite likely that he acquired an admiration for Whately’s
personality through Parsons, long before he got involved with the study of logic.90
5. Lacroix’s impact upon De Morgan, 1828–1833
5.1. De Morgan in defense of mathematical studies
In reality, our senses are our first mathematical instructors. [De Morgan, 1831a, 2]
After being appointed Professor of Mathematics at London University, De Morgan undertook to
defend the study of this branch against common charges and propose efficient methods for its instruction
at an elementary level. The ideas contained in embryo in his “Introductory lecture” [De Morgan,
1828]—mentioned in Section 1.2—were elaborated on in an ensuing lecture, published as Remarks on
Elementary Education [De Morgan, 1830]. By that time, he had composed an article “On mathematical
instruction” [De Morgan, 1831b] and a booklet On the Study and Difficulties of Mathematics [De Morgan,
1831a], cited as SDM (Section 1.1). SDM was published by the Society for the Diffusion of Useful
Knowledge (SDUK), founded by Lord Brougham in 1825, in association with London University.91 As
88 See [S. De Morgan, 1882, 85–93; Garland, 1980, 34; Rice, 1996, 230–231; Rice, 1997b, 96–99; Smith, 1982, 40–55].
89 See letters exchanged between De Morgan and Higman in 1847–1848, University College Library, MS.Add. 97/5. See also
[Smith, 1984b; Richards, 1991].
90 On Parsons’s influence upon De Morgan, see [S. De Morgan, 1882, 3–11; Rice, 1997b, 15–20]. The “Bampton lectures” at
Oxford University were a series of lectures on theology [Corsi, 1988, 16, 67, 76, 100–101].
91 The SDUK aimed to “facilitate the education of the working man by means of intelligible books on academic subjects
published at affordable prices” [Rice, 1997a, 270; Rice, 1997b, 108–110]. According to the latter, De Morgan had proposed
submitting his SDM to the SDUK in March 1830. SDM proved very successful, reprinted in the United States in the 20th
century [Grattan-Guinness, 1992c, 3; MacFarlane, 1916, 21–22; Pycior, 1983, 213].
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Journal of Education (QJE), which was sponsored by the SDUK.92
SDM bears striking similarities, in both its structure and content, to Lacroix’s Essais, while instances
from De Morgan’s earlier and later writings lead to our viewing Lacroix’s tract as a key link between
the Oxford-based revival of syllogistic logic and De Morgan’s Cambridge heritage in applied and pure
mathematics. In line with the Essais, SDM was divided into four parts, concerning the teaching of
arithmetic (4–18), algebra (18–64), geometry (65–91), and trigonometry (91–93), respectively. Alluding
to Laplace’s lectures at the Ecole Normale in connection with the dangers entailed in the careless use of
the method of induction,93 De Morgan revealed his basic sources, claiming that (63)
Both the preceptor and the pupil, but especially the former, will derive great advantage from the perusal of Lacroix, Essais sur
l’Enseignement en géneral et sur celui des Mathématiques en particulier, Condillac, La langue des Calculs, and the various articles
on the elements of algebra in the French Encyclopedia, which are for the most part written by D’Alembert.
Although this was his only reference to Lacroix’s tract, there are indications which lead to the
impression that he had gone through it much earlier. In 1828, he asked the beginner “in all his
embarrassment” to rely on the word of his instructor [De Morgan, 1828, 40], according to D’Alembert’s
motto: “Go forward and faith will follow.”94 Moreover, in line with Laplace and Lacroix, he argued on
the import of analysis in the invention of fertile theories in physical astronomy, claiming:
Never was the talent of invention so brilliantly displayed as in the various successful attempts by which, from the time of Newton
to that of Laplace, all the phenomena of the solar system were mathematically demonstrated to result from the operations of the
Newtonian Law of Gravity.95
Thus proving that mathematics does not “deaden the imagination,” he refuted the view according to
which mathematics “destroy the taste for literature” by praising the writings of Pascal, Descartes, Leibniz,
and D’Alembert equally for “spirit, taste, and beauty” and for “scientific talent” [De Morgan, 1828,
30–32]. Questions of priority were not absent from his lecture, which included a comparison between
mathematics and natural philosophy (40–44).
De Morgan showed a great sensitivity to the study of arithmetic, which he called the “groundwork of
the mathematics” [De Morgan, 1830, 12]. It was perhaps through Lacroix that he also became acquainted
with Condillac, furnishing in the title page of his textbook on Arithmetic (1830) a quotation attributed to
him:
92 During the period of his resignation (1831–1835), De Morgan contributed several book reviews, a variety of scientific
commentaries, and his most significant writings on instruction under the editorship of George Long (see comments in
[S. De Morgan, 1882, 407–414; Rice, 1997b, 98–111]). Although, as [Corsi, 1988, 118] noted, the QJE was almost entirely
written by De Morgan, we should add another notable contributor, Baden Powel (1796–1860), Professor of Geometry at Oriel
College, Oxford, from 1827. A member of the SDUK from 1830, Powel was a close friend of both Whately and De Morgan.
93 See [SDM, 63]. De Morgan displayed his own translation of [Laplace, 1795, 41], without, however, revealing his exact
source. Apparently he became acquainted with Laplace’s lectures through Lacroix’s Essais (Section 2).
94 On D’Alembert’s principle, mentioned in [Lacroix, 1828, 175; Richards, 1991, 298], see [De Morgan, 1828, 38–40].
95 De Morgan developed a fascination for Laplace’s celestial mechanics through his tutors at Cambridge (Section 4.3).
However, the tone and poetic style of his lecture on this issue hint at a direct impact of Laplace’s and Lacroix’s appraisal
of enlightenment science and philosophy. One may be surprised today by the erroneous exaggeration of this passage (i.e., “all
the phenomena, . . .”); nevertheless, this was exactly the message delivered by those authors at the turn of the century.
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understanding rationally what one does: such a habit is acquired more easily than one thinks; and once acquired, it is never lost.96
In his Remarks [De Morgan, 1830, 13] he drew once more on Condillac, choosing a quotation already
deployed by Lacroix (Section 2.2):
I would even go as far as to say that the science of arithmetic is more easy than the art [. . .] It has been well observed by Condillac,
in treating of this very subject that a rule is like the parapet of a bridge; it may keep a careless passenger from tumbling over, but will
not help him walk forward.
He claimed next that algebra may be seen as “an easy generalization of arithmetic” [De Morgan, 1830,
14], focusing thereafter on a comparative study between algebra and geometry. Interestingly enough, he
did so in a manner congenial, if not identical, to Lacroix’s own. He held that “Geometry, which is a
science more pleasing to the majority of learners than algebra and which is for the purposes of the many,
the more useful of the two, might be taught at an earlier age than is the custom at present” [De Morgan,
1830, 15]. Noting, however, that the advanced study of geometry in “the most rigorous form” should
best be postponed for a later period of instruction, he more or less repeated Lacroix’s own arguments
(Section 2.2).
In connection with the teaching of algebra, De Morgan drew on both Lacroix and Laplace. By holding
that “The new symbols of algebra should not be all explained to the student at once. He should be led
from the full to the abridged notation, in the same manner as those were, who first adopted the latter”
[De Morgan, 1831b, 277], he followed Clairaut’s method based upon historical discovery, recommended
by both his mentors. Furthermore, after Euler (see [Lacroix, 1828, 170–187, 252]), he proposed the
creation on the student’s part of a “syllabus of results only, unaccompanied by any demonstration,” so
that the student would acquire “memory for algebraical formulae, which will save time and labor in the
higher departments of the science” [De Morgan, 1831a, 63].
Laplace’s influence is mostly evident in SDM. In line with the former’s lectures on algebra
(Section 2.1), De Morgan initiated the student into algebraic notation through an arithmetical example,
with the intention of leading him all the way from numerals to the symbolic formula, by representing
the verbal expression of “half the sum of two numbers added to half their [absolute] difference, gives the
greater of the two numbers.” However, he enriched his material with more examples than Laplace, further
offering his own original intermediate step between purely numerical and purely symbolical formulae as
follows: “(First No + second No)/2− (First No − second No)/2 = First No” [De Morgan, 1831a, 18].
Without yet touching upon the instruction of geometry, we can trace so many similarities between
Lacroix’s and Laplace’s texts on the one hand, and De Morgan’s writings on the other, that we are
tempted to accuse him of plagiarism. Nonetheless, De Morgan engraved his own synthesis of the French
philosophy of education and his training at Cambridge, as revealed, for instance, in his emphasis on exer-
cising the student’s familiarity with the binomial theorem through examples, prior to furnishing him with
the general proof [De Morgan, 1831a, 62]. Lacroix, after Laplace, had stressed the importance of general
96 As a student, De Morgan read Peacock’s article on “Arithmetic” four years before its publication in the Encyclopedia
Metropolitana in 1830. Interestingly enough, Condillac’s La langue was found in Peacock’s library [Durand, 1990, 141–144].
Nonetheless, Peacock did not draw on Condillac’s work in his article, so we have no means of establishing his plausible influence
upon De Morgan in the direction of Condillac’s philosophy of arithmetic. In any case, the passage that follows below in text
hints at Lacroix’s influence in this direction. On the success of De Morgan’s textbook on arithmetic, see [Rice, 1997b, 86–87].
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wrongly introduced pupils to algebra by means of examples alone [Lacroix, 1828, 173–176, 203, 264–
270]. Between these extremes, De Morgan echoed Whewell by proposing a “middle course,” that is by
urging instructors to suit “the nature of the proof to the student’s capacity” [De Morgan, 1831a, 62].
Before switching to De Morgan’s views on the teaching of geometry, we wish to clarify a subtle
point concerning his debt to the empirical philosophers, Locke and Condillac, in his early educational
writings. After them, he insisted that a pupil should be initiated into first principles carefully, after being
experimentally trained through “ocular demonstration” [De Morgan, 1828, 13–15], by claiming that our
senses are our “first mathematical instructors” [De Morgan, 1831a, 1–3]. Such instances, however, should
not mislead us into regarding the first stage of his career as an exclusively “traditional empiricist stage”
[Pycior, 1983] which would be abandoned from 1835 onwards.97 Just like Lacroix, De Morgan drew on
these empirical philosophers strictly in connection with the instruction of elementary mathematics and
the very early stages of the student’s initiation. For, in the same writings (Section 5.2), De Morgan showed
evident traces of his debt to the PRL, foreshadowing statements put forward in 1835, which would be
wrongly considered by historians as uniquely characterizing his new, modern approach to mathematics.
5.2. Is reasoning peculiar to geometry only?
And we may ask, how comes that reasoning, utterly banished from arithmetic and algebra, preserved its place as an essential of
geometry? [De Morgan, 1831b, 268–269]
In his “Introductory lecture” De Morgan [1828, 8] claimed that “the success of every individual in
the world must depend on his power of reasoning.” He went on to defend mathematics against common
criticism, concluding, “wherever previously formed habits of abstraction and generalization are valuable,
the preparation of mathematical studies is useful in the highest degree” [De Morgan, 1828, 43–44]. A few
years later, he argued in more explicit terms, that mathematical demonstration is “strictly logical” and that
“The same species of logic is used in all inquiries after truth,” “logic” standing for “accurate reasoning.”98
But if, in theory, mathematical instruction could nurture the reasoning capacity of the student, what about
its efficiency in practice?
De Morgan raised the latter issue in his Remarks. He held that mathematical education suffered not
merely from inadequate but rather from erroneous methods, as instructors tended to emphasize exercising
the faculty of “dry memory” instead of trying to make first principles intelligible to the pupils. He
argued that, by directing the students’ attention to “rules only, not to the principles on which they are
established,” instructors had excluded “reasoning and reflection” entirely from arithmetic, which as a
science “is the most adapted for the development of these faculties in the young mind” [De Morgan,
1830, 12]. Firmly believing that arithmetic was a paradigmatic field for the mind’s training in the process
of “generalization by induction,” he illustrated his point by drawing on the Pythagorean number theory.99
97 On De Morgan’s debt to Locke, see [De Morgan, 1828, 13–25; De Morgan, 1831a, 1–3; Pycior, 1983, 212–216; Rice,
1997b, 69–70]. However, not all of De Morgan’s early educational views stemmed uniquely from Locke’s empirical philosophy
(see Section 5.2).
98 See [De Morgan, 1831a, 3; De Morgan, 1831b, 265]. Ironically, in 1842, De Morgan criticized Whewell for freewheelingly
deploying the term “logic” as a synonym for “correct reasoning”; see [De Morgan, 1842, 12–13; Todhunter, 1876, I, 108].
99 Namely, that the addition of any successive numbers, starting from 1, will always result in a square number [De Morgan,
1830, 9]. The Pythagoreans were not mentioned at this point, but the history of mathematics was often a source upon which
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argued, in fact, that if it is necessary to “learn to reason,” then “in no case is the assertion more completely
verified than in the study of algebra” [De Morgan, 1831a, 60–63]. In brief, neither arithmetic nor algebra
was devoid of reasoning. How then, he asked, did reasoning preserve its place uniquely within geometry,
or, as it was called, “mathematics” [De Morgan, 1831b, 268–269]? Moreover, could we presume with
certainty that “all who learn geometry will learn to reason correctly” [De Morgan, 1833b, 238]?
De Morgan felt induced to account for the instructors’ misconception in accepting geometry as the
only vehicle for the exercise of mathematical reasoning, and consequently to restore reasoning within
mathematical education, commencing with an overview of the defective teaching of geometry. The
first misconception, he argued, was partly due to the poor instruction of algebra: “It was probably
the experience of the inutility of general demonstration to the very young student that caused the
abandonment of reasoning which prevailed so much in English works of elementary mathematics”
[De Morgan, 1831a, 62]. On a different note, he wrote: “We suspect it arose from the fact of the treatise of
Euclid being found already established, and the disinclination to overturn any institution being so great,
that this work preserved its place in spite of its truth and beauty” [De Morgan, 1831b, 269]. And as for
geometry’s instruction, De Morgan pointed out many weaknesses that needed serious consideration.
It was first noted that the study of mathematics in general was delayed “till what is comparatively
so late a period in life” [De Morgan, 1830, 11; De Morgan, 1831b, 275]. Moreover, when a pupil was
confronted with Euclid’s Elements, he was unable to follow the route of demonstration, as he lacked any
preliminary experimental training [De Morgan, 1830, 14–16]. De Morgan lamented also the tendency
of instructors to demand that the pupil memorize the right order of propositions.101 Last, but not least,
teachers failed to realize that the first book of the Elements hardly afforded a favorable basis for initiating
a student into geometry, commencing, as it were, with certain far from evident definitions and axioms, as
well as some “troublesome propositions” [De Morgan, 1831b, 275].
In an effort to amend the situation, he furnished a paper “On the method of teaching geometry”
[De Morgan, 1833a, 1833b], announcing its unusual division into two parts: the first related “to the
manner of teaching the terms and the facts of geometry,” and the second to “the method of deducing
them from one another by reasoning” [De Morgan, 1833a, 35]. We might say that what the instructors’
methodological framework seemed to lack until then was a proper distinction between the “matter” and
“form” of geometry, respectively, a distinction successfully deployed in those terms by De Morgan in his
mature work on logic.102 The idea for such a division occurred to him in 1831, in an attempt to advise
De Morgan based his views; see [De Morgan, 1830, 8–9; De Morgan, 1831a, 12 and 63]. According to him, arithmetic was
considered a most important prerequisite for the study of algebra; see [De Morgan, 1830, 12–14; De Morgan, 1831a, 17–18;
De Morgan, 1831b, 266–271]. On De Morgan’s own efficiency as a teacher, see [Howson, 1982, 80–84; Rice, 1999].
100 He dealt at length with the method of induction, mainly in connection with the binomial theorem [De Morgan, 1831a,
60–63]. We recall his debt to Laplace’s lectures quoted in SDM (Section 5.1). In 1838, he distinguished between “mathematical”
and “scientific” induction, the former being De Morgan’s own term [Rice, 1997b, 122].
101 On lines fairly identical to [Laplace, 1795, 20–21], De Morgan wrote: “There seems to be a magic in numbers, which no
one can withstand, from Leibniz, who proposed to convert the King of China to Christianity, by means of binary arithmetic,
to the mathematical master of a country school, who measures his pupils’ conviction of geometrical truths by their power
of recollecting the order in which they come” [De Morgan, 1831b, 269]. Further on the abuse of the faculty of memory, see
[De Morgan, 1830, 14; Lacroix, 1828, 285–291].
102 On De Morgan’s “form–matter” distinction within logic, see [De Morgan, 1858] and comments in [Hodges, 2000; Merrill,
1990, Chapter 4]. As argued in [Panteki, 1992, Sections 3.4–3.9, 6.3–6.8], this distinction featured in different terms as a
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first book. As he wrote [De Morgan, 1831b, 275]:
It would not be contrary to good logic, to assume the whole of the first book of Euclid, and from it to prove the second, provided that
afterwards the first book were proved, without the necessity of taking for granted any proposition in the second. The argument [. . .]
would then stand thus:
If the first book be true, the second is true.
But the first book is true.
Therefore the second is true.
The order in which the premises come, does not affect the soundness of the conclusions, and provided the pupil understands that
the conclusion depends equally on the premises and the reasoning grounded upon them, which are two distinct things, an error in one
not necessarily affecting the other, he is perfectly safe, and takes a view of the process of reasoning not generally given to the young.
Representative of De Morgan’s idiosyncratic style, this passage deserves attention in so far as he
clearly distinguished in it between the “matter” or “premises” and the “form” or “reasoning” of geometry,
respectively. In so doing, he prepared the ground for the arguments put forward in his review of
Peacock’s Algebra four years later, where within a more general context he stressed the difference
between the “certainty of mathematical conclusions” and the “correctness of mathematical reasoning”
[De Morgan, 1835a, 95]. Although De Morgan’s crucial epistemological distinction as well as his singular
attention to the importance of reasoning have not escaped historians’ attention, we wish to clarify certain
misconceptions concerning the true origins of his statements of 1835.
According to Pycior [1983, 217], the distinction between the truth of mathematical conclusions and
the accuracy of reasoning was revolutionary, inducing her to claim that by 1835 De Morgan was moving
“towards a more modern conception of mathematics [than in the earlier ‘empirical stage’] which stressed
its deductive nature rather than the self-evidence of its concepts and axioms.” As we noted above, this
distinction was far from new in his review of 1835, but stemmed from his earlier desire to amend the
problematic long-standing tradition governing the instruction of geometry. What remains is to consider
the stimuli that led De Morgan to develop such a systematic concern for geometry and its reasoning in
the first place.
According to Rice [1997b, 73], Kant must have been an influential source in this respect, although not
“mentioned by name” in De Morgan’s writings. Due to lack of substantial evidence we cannot argue for
or against this view. However, we wish to draw attention to an interesting note written by De Morgan on
a copy of his Remarks, found in the Royal Society Library, which runs as follows:
Most of the opinions contained in this lecture which are opposed to those of Kant’s philosophy were found by the author, about four
years after it was written, in a pamphlet by Mr. (Dr?) Beddoes entitled “Observations on the nature of demonstrative Evidence with
an explanation of the difficulties occurring in the Elements of Geometry by Thomas Beddoes. London J. Johnson, 1793”. But the
conclusions drawn are different.103
In any case, we hold that De Morgan’s own debt to Locke and Condillac, through his perusal of
Lacroix’s Essais, must had been quite contradictory to any plausible debt owed to Kant at that stage.
Especially in connection with geometry’s instruction, the influence of Lacroix and the PRL is too strongly
methodological tool for his study of the calculus of functions in 1836, thereafter influencing his study of algebra and logic. But
the origin of this distinction stemmed from his concern for geometry in 1831, as noted in text below.
103 The inscription bears no signature, but a comparative study leads to De Morgan as its author. Thomas Beddoes (1760–1808),
an Oxford graduate, was a physician and scientist. The question of Kant’s influence upon De Morgan at this stage remains open.
310 M. Panteki / Historia Mathematica 30 (2003) 278–340evident in De Morgan’s writings of that period to leave an open question as to his sources. Indeed, in line
with the PRL, De Morgan asked instructors “To defer every axiom, until that point is arrived at, where
it becomes necessary,” or “To omit those propositions which are not subsequently useful” [De Morgan,
1831b, 276]. Such an influence is further evident in [De Morgan, 1833a], which concerned the “matter”
of Euclidean geometry, and the ideal order of its instruction (compare with [Lacroix, 1828, 274–312]).
The “form” of geometry was considered in Chapter 14 of SDM and consequently in [De Morgan,
1833b] (Section 5.3). Interestingly enough, Chapter 14 was preceded by a preliminary one “On the
definitions of geometry” [De Morgan, 1831a, 65–68], which opened with a comparative study of algebra
and geometry. This could have been seen as a rather unusual way of introducing the basic concepts of
geometry, had it not been for Lacroix’s similar comparison soon after he had briefly associated geometry
and logic, as well as for De Morgan’s tendency to furnish links between diverse issues in his discourse,
a tendency once again largely due to Lacroix’s own encyclopedistic style (Sections 1.3, 2, and 5.1).
De Morgan argued extensively on why geometry was easier for the student to grasp than algebra. He
supported that the results of elementary geometry “are in many cases sufficiently evident of themselves
to the eye” whereas in algebra “many rudimentary propositions derive no evidence from the senses”
[De Morgan, 1831a, 65]. Moreover, according to him “there is nothing in the elements of pure geometry
comparable, in point of complexity, to the theory of the negative sign, of fractional indices, or the
decomposition of an expression of the second degree in factors.” Above all, the symbols deployed in
geometry were of a “less general nature” than those of algebra. Elaborating on the latter issue, he wrote
[De Morgan, 1831a, 65]:
In algebra a general proposition respecting numbers is to be proved. Letters are taken which may represent any of the numbers
in question, and the course of the demonstration, far from making any use of the particular case, does not allow that any reasoning,
however general in its nature, is conclusive, unless the symbols are as general as the arguments. We do not say that it would be contrary
to good logic to form general conclusions from reasoning on one particular case, when it is evident that the same considerations
might be applied to any other, but only that very great caution [. . .] would be required in deducing the conclusions. There occurs also
a mixture of general and particular propositions, and the latter are liable to be mistaken for the former. In geometry, on the contrary
[. . .] any proposition may be safely demonstrated on any particular case.
Obviously stimulated by Lacroix, De Morgan’s comparative study was more penetrating, as well as
original, than his mentor’s. For, Lacroix firmly believed, after Laplace, that the generality of algebraic
methods renders the instruction of algebra straightforward, dispensing with the necessity of furnishing
many appropriate examples [Lacroix, 1828, 274–275, 299]. Moreover, Lacroix argued that the particular
nature of geometry burdened the instructor with the “embarrassing” responsibility of choosing the right
examples. Both agreed that geometry could ideally exercise the student’s capacity in logical reasoning.
But whereas for Lacroix the study of geometry sufficed for this purpose (Section 2.2), for De Morgan
[1833b, 238] that was not so:
Geometry, as it is usually studied, does not teach the principles of reasoning, but applies them [. . .] to the consideration of the
properties of space. There is, therefore, no reason to presume that all who learn geometry will learn to reason correctly.
To sum up, it is clear that De Morgan did not identify mathematics with geometrical reasoning. On the
contrary, believing, as he did, that this long-standing identification was largely erroneous, he introduced
the basics of traditional syllogistic, with a view to arguing on the indispensability of a student’s training
in logic prior to his acquaintance with the complex nature of geometrical demonstration. Accordingly,
Chapter 13 ended as follows [De Morgan, 1831a, 68]:
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essential difference between the manner of deducing results from first principles, in any science.
5.3. An association of geometry with syllogistic logic
Whately’s Logic [. . .]. A work, which should be read by all mathematical students. [De Morgan, 1831a, 71, fn.]
Apparently acquainted with Whately’s Elements around 1829, De Morgan explicitly referred to it in
SDM above quoted.104 Among the merits of the Elements that plausibly attracted De Morgan’s attention
at that time was Whately’s lucid account of fallacies (Section 3.1), an issue particularly attended to in
Lacroix’s Essais. Critical toward the prevailing elementary textbooks on mathematics, Lacroix [1828,
176] had urged instructors to prevent their pupils from “the errors of reasoning” and the “seduction of
paralogism” through an “analysis of the diverse forms of reasoning.” Armed with Whately’s study on
this issue, De Morgan followed Lacroix’s advice in full, devoting to this end Chapter 14 of SDM and his
paper [De Morgan, 1833b].
As a matter of fact, he prepared the ground for his more systematic treatment given in SDM in
[De Morgan, 1831b, 272], where, after claiming that “It is useless to present reasoning in any shape
until the language is perfectly familiar,” he wrote in reference to pupils that “they have no acquaintance
with the more general part of grammar which is the foundation of the forms of logic,” alluding to
Whately’s link between language and reasoning. Within this context, he noted that pupils often confound
the “converse of a proposition” with “the proposition itself.” Similarly, he called attention to the fact
that “every point in figure A is a point of figure B” does not imply that “every point of B is a point
of A” [De Morgan, 1831a, 69]. Furthermore, he noted that pupils do not have adequate training in
acknowledging a “defect in the method of reasoning, but only by the absurdity of the conclusion,”
as in the case of “all animals are birds” [De Morgan, 1833b, 240]. Such fallacies demanded the
pupil’s acquaintance with the various forms of strict reasoning, geometry serving heuristically for this
purpose.
In SDM, he assumed, in line with Whately, that “all reasoning” could be reduced to a number of “single
propositions,” each of which is divided into the “subject,” the “predicate,” and the “copula” [De Morgan,
1831a, 68]. By means of simple geometrical assertions, he initiated the pupils into the four basic types of
propositions (A, E, I, O), noting that these assertions must be derived in one of the following ways: from
the definition, from hypothesis, from the evidence of the assertions (axioms), and from proof already
given [De Morgan, 1831a, 69–70]. Drawing on the latter case, he claimed that “no assertion can be
the direct and necessary consequence of two others, unless those two contain something in common”
[De Morgan, 1831a, 70]. Repeating in different terms an assertion expressed in common language, for
instance, as “geometry is useful, and therefore ought to be studied,” we may arrive at a “syllogism,” such
as:
Everything useful is what ought to be studied.
Geometry is useful,
(5.3.1)therefore geometry is what ought to be studied.
104 In [De Morgan, 1831a, 71, fn.], he mentioned the third edition of the Elements, dated 1829 (Section 3.1). Moreover, on the
copy of SDM in the Royal Society Library, we read the inscription “1829–1831” in his own handwriting. Thus, he probably
began writing this booklet around 1829.
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Euclid’s Elements. This scheme deviates from traditional syllogistic logic, and so also does De Morgan’s
pioneering acceptance of “is equal to” together with the traditional copula “is” as distinct copulas in his
account [De Morgan, 1831a, 68, 73–75]. De Morgan was unaware at that time of Thomas Reid’s (1710–
1796) thesis that traditional syllogism did not suffice for mathematical proof. De Morgan would realize
later on the impossible task of casting Euclidean geometry in syllogistic form. Nonetheless, his endeavor
to do so for educational reasons paved a way for his original work on the logic of relations in the 1850s.105
Drawing on geometry, he illustrated the 4 figures and the 19 legitimate moods of syllogistic logic,
prior to himself being acquainted with Euler’s similar device (Section 2.1). For instance, figure I, mood
AAA was furnished by the example (72):
All the circle is in the triangle.
(5.3.2)All the square is in the circle.
∴All the square is in the triangle.
Or, indicative of figure III, mood AII, was the following example (73):
The axioms constitute part of the basis of geometry.
(5.3.3)Some of the axioms are grounded on the evidence of the senses.
∴Some evidence derived from the senses is part of the basis of geometry.
He next defined “Inductive reasoning” and “Reasoning a fortiori.” The former proves a universal
proposition by separately proving each one of its particular cases. For instance, a figure ABCD “is proved
to be a rectangle by proving each of its angles separately to be a right angle” (73). The latter type, he
held, was contained in figure I, mood AAA, in a different form:
A is greater than B (or the whole of B is contained in A),
(5.3.4)B is greater than C (or the whole of C is contained in B),
a fortiori A is greater than C (therefore C is contained in A).
Could one indeed reduce all geometrical arguments to one of these types of syllogistic reasoning? As
noted above, De Morgan was unaware of the controversy concerning the reduction of relational forms,
such as “is equal to” or “is greater than,” which involved the transitivity of the copula, to syllogistic
form. He confined himself to confirming the alleged adequacy of traditional logic in treating any valid,
deductive type of reasoning, by claiming, that “The elements of geometry present a collection of such
reasoning as we have just described, though in a more condensed form” [De Morgan, 1831a, 73]. To
support his claim, he picked up Pythagoras’ theorem as “a specimen of a geometrical proposition reduced
nearly to a syllogistic form.” The reduction he furnished was evidently incomplete, involving propositions
such as “AB and BE are equal,” or “BG is equal to BC,” which were not questioned as to their capacity
to be reduced to the form “A is B.”106
105 Hamilton edited Reid’s works in 1846, so there was no possibility of De Morgan’s acquaintance with them in 1831 [Merrill,
1990, 15–25]. According to [Merrill, 1990, ix, 23–25], De Morgan’s dual use of “is” and “is equal to” as two distinct copulas
was his first major innovation in logic. On De Morgan’s mature views on the utopic connections between geometry and logic,
see [Merrill, 1990, Chapter 7]. On modus ponens, see [Merrill, 1990, 10, 18, 28].
106 The full reduction of Pythagoras’s theorem to syllogistic form—an endeavor first attributed to Dasypodious and Herlinus—
requires the full resource of first-order predicate logic [Merrill, 1990, Chapters 1–2]. On the controversy between Reid and
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Nonetheless, De Morgan’s joint attention to Aristotelian logic and Euclidean geometry was largely
original, including an early perception of what was to become the logic of relations a few decades later.
For, as he wrote [De Morgan, 1831a, 76]:
the validity of an argument depends upon two distinct considerations, −1 the truth of the relations assumed [. . .], −2 the manner in
which these facts are combined so as to produce new relations; in the last the reasoning properly consists [. . .]. We are accustomed
to talk of mathematical reasoning as above all other, in point of accuracy and soundness. This, if by the term reasoning we mean the
comparing together of different ideas and producing other ideas from the comparison, is not correct, for in this view mathematical
reasoning and all other reasonings correspond exactly.
Once again, he stressed the deductive nature of geometrical reasoning in 1833, noting that “we confine
the term logic to its strict meaning, not supposing it to have any reference to the truth or falsehood of
assertions themselves, but only to the circumstances under which two of them give us a right to deduce a
third” [De Morgan, 1833b, 243]. Like its former part, [De Morgan, 1833b] was in full accordance with
Lacroix’s hints, under the influence of the PRL. De Morgan noted that special care could be taken in the
use of the method of reductio ad absurdum, aware of the fact that pupils had difficulties in discriminating
between contradictory and contrary propositions. Thus, he recommended a minimal use of this method,
until the students could understand this difference. Furthermore, students were encouraged to “retrace
the steps” in certain propositions, so as to become accustomed to “the analytical method, by which alone
they can hope to succeed in the solution of problems” [De Morgan, 1833b, 251].
Although De Morgan [1833b] referred to his account of syllogistic logic in SDM, he omitted any
details, and in general, his earlier attempt to cast Euclidean geometry in syllogistic form never resurfaced
in his subsequent writings on logic. It is also worth noting that it was only in 1833 that he became aware
of Euler’s logical diagrams [De Morgan, 1833b, 239; De Morgan, 1847, 323–324]. In conclusion, the
message delivered in his article of 1833 was that logic was an important prerequisite for the study of
geometry [De Morgan, 1833b, 238–239]:
The principles on which geometrical propositions are established belong to the totally distinct and equally simple science of logic; and
since geometry without logic would be absurd, it is desirable that the principles of the latter science should be studied with precision
previously to employing them upon the former.
6. Cambridge curriculum revisited, 1827–1835
6.1. Whewell’s counterrevolution, 1832
More than a decade of teaching had convinced [Whewell] that as a young tutor he had taken too analytic an approach. He began his
counter-revolution with the same weapon the analysts had used: the textbook. Then he turned to writing pedagogical tracts. [Becher,
1980b, 25]
Soon after declaring to Herschel in 1818 that he “would not be surprised if in a short time we
were only to read a few propositions of Newton, as a matter of curiosity” [Todhunter, 1876, II, 30],
Hamilton over the transitivity of equality, and De Morgan’s failure to cast this theorem in syllogistic form, see [Merrill, 1990,
27–35].
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between synthetics (Newton) and analytics (Laplace) in 1823, he encouraged his students to study
and simplify Laplace’s MC. Under his suggestions, Airy’s Tracts in 1826, an intermediary between
Whewell’s elementary treatises and MC, fostered the theory of the earth’s shape, to incorporate from
1831 the wave theory of light. By 1830, Whewell’s article “On electricity” directed the attention of
capable wranglers and Tripos moderators to new topics, such as the theory of electricity, magnetism, and
heat, branches related to his own study of Laplace’s coefficients (Sections 4.2–4.3).
Thus, largely due to Whewell’s own efforts, the curriculum was enriched in 1830 with new physical
subjects, a fact that met with his full approval. However, in order to satisfy the demands of such an
expansion, the Tripos was accordingly enriched with more questions on pure mathematics, including,
for instance, definite integrals, infinite series, and advanced algebra [Becher, 1980b, 23–24]. The
curriculum’s growth in the direction of analytics was inconsistent with Whewell’s views of a liberal
education. He reacted by revising his former treatises on mechanics in 1832. By arguing on the merits of
Newton’s Principia, along with claiming that the “admirable” treatises of Lagrange and Laplace were not
suited for the “common” student, Whewell tried to persuade his audience that the ultimate scope of the
teaching of mechanics should be uniquely linked to the mastering of Newton’s Principia. In full contrast
with his initial declarations, Whewell now stimulated his students towards an attempt “to simplify and
explain the Third Book of the Principia,” rather than the difficult parts of MC.107
Whewell’s early oscillation between the treatises of Newton and Laplace did not last long. In 1826,
he discouraged Airy from including segments from MC in his Tracts, and from then onwards stood
firm against any updating of the Tracts in this respect (Section 4.2). As it were, Whewell gradually
developed an aversion for Laplace’s potential theory, and in his own work on tides in the 1830s, for
which he received a Royal Medal in 1837,108 he employed 18th-century equilibrium theory, which
drew on geometrico-physical procedures. When Airy attacked him for deploying old-fashioned methods,
Whewell replied that Laplace’s analysis only leads to differential equations, “which we cannot integrate”
[Becher, 1980b, 24–26]. Thus, if Laplace’s theory did not suit the purposes of Whewell’s advanced
physical inquiries, how could it possibly suit those of a liberal, nonprofessional education?
The intricacy of Laplace’s analytical methods, however, formed only one reason that accounted
for Whewell’s predilection for Newton’s work. For all his initial progressive attitude, as a tutor and
moderator in the 1820s Whewell did his best to ensure that pure mathematics was subordinate to applied
by enriching the Tripos with questions on mixed mathematics (Section 4.2). However, in 1830 mixed
mathematics were prone to give way to pure, and this meant for Whewell fewer chances to diffuse and
practice his current views on education, as formulated over the years in conjunction with his views on
religion, morality, and the philosophy of science. His implicit retreat from MC in 1826, coincided with
his intention to deliver “grand lectures on the principles of induction in mixed mathematics” [Todhunter,
1876, II, 71–72], a plan that failed at the time (Section 3.2). Inductive reasoning for Whewell entailed a
strong sense of morality, but such matters were disclosed but to his intimate correspondents, like Richard
Jones and the theologian Hugh James Rose.109 As he wrote to the latter in 1826: “What I hold is that
107 See [Whewell, 1832c, iv]. On Whewell’s treatises on mechanics, briefly commented upon below, see [Becher, 1980b,
24–26; Todhunter, 1876, I, Chapter 2; Yeo, 1993, 93–99].
108 On Whewell’s work on tides, see [Becher, 1991, 13–15; Todhunter, 1876, I, Chapter 6; Yeo, 1993, 53–55].
109 A close friend of Whewell, Hugh James Rose (1795–1838), was the Christian Advocate at Cambridge; see [Corsi, 1988,
28–30, 40–41; Todhunter, 1876, I, xxii–xxiii].
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be true it must harmonize with all the great truths of religion” [Todhunter, 1876 II,78].
From 1830 onward, Whewell decided to progressively unravel his views on the philosophy of science,
stimulated by the Oxford–Cambridge debate on political economy, and the books published by Herschel
and Jones on related issues (Section 3.2). He thus resumed his long-standing interest in the neglected
virtues of induction and proceeded to present some of his views to the public. On a different tone, he
included certain of them in the Prefaces to his revised treatises, namely his First Principles of Mechanics
[Whewell, 1832a], Dynamics [Whewell, 1832b], and The Free Motion of Points [Whewell, 1832c]. Here,
we draw on his Dynamics, where Whewell argued upon the laborious but sure process of ascending from
observation to successive levels of abstraction and generalization in mechanics through induction.
After noting that the laws of motion represented a luminous example of a perfect mature science, he
wrote [Whewell, 1832b, x]:
We often feel disposed to believe that truths so clear and comprehensive are necessary conditions, rather than empirical attributes, of
their subjects: that they are legible by their own axiomatic light, like the first truths of geometry, rather than discovered by the blind
groping of experience. And even when the experimental foundation of these principles is allowed, there is still no curiosity about the
details of the induction by which they are established.
On the other hand, he claimed, the process of deduction “fills the mind at every step with a confidence
of its workings, a consciousness of certainty,” so that men feel no fascination in following the “more
difficult path” that leads to the ascent of first principles, i.e., that of induction [Whewell, 1832b, xi]. And
he added that, by reasoning deductively there can be “no truth contained in the conclusion, which is not
involved in the premises: good logic is the one thing requisite; and no name can convert bad logic into
good, nor any authority add to the evidence of demonstrated truth” [Whewell, 1832b, xvi].
In line with a passage quoted in Section 3.2 from his Astronomy, he deployed above the term “logic”
as synonymous for strict, deductive reasoning, the par excellence characteristic of that entailed in
mathematics, and geometry in particular.110 In many respects, however, his statements on induction were
cryptic or inconsistent with those he adhered to from 1831 onwards, and would reveal in later works.
By emphasizing the difficulties involved in the inductive process of discovery, he implicitly alluded to
a sense of morality, of which analytical methods were devoid due to their mechanical nature. In his
Astronomy [Whewell, 1833, Chapters 5–6] he would go as far compare the authorities of Newton and
Laplace in terms of their religious beliefs, which accounted largely for their distinct approach toward
induction. Issues concerning religious faith would not enter the discourse of his educational textbooks.
However, in his Thoughts he would establish more clearly the position put forward in his treatises of
1832, by claiming that “A scheme of study, which escapes or tries to escape the labor of thinking, will
answer none of the purposes at which we ought to aim.”111
110 According to [Becher, 1980b, 24], geometry was the only form of pure mathematics that Whewell “found aesthetically
satisfying”; see also [Whewell, 1837b]. On Whewell’s use of the term “logic,” see Footnote 98, and on his identification of
mathematics with deductive syllogistic logic, see also Section 3.2 and Footnote 52. We note that the tone deployed in his
educational tract is milder than that used in his ensuing Astronomy, “good logic” in the former being indeed “the one thing
requisite.”
111 See [Whewell, 1835, 42]. On Whewell’s aversion to analytics, as a branch of mathematics “insensible to moral evidence,”
see [Ashworth, 1996, 647]. Further on Whewell’s views on morality, and Newton’s personality, see also [Becher, 1991, 18;
316 M. Panteki / Historia Mathematica 30 (2003) 278–340On the other hand, his first pedagogical tract (Section 6.3) would incorporate in brief the position
according to which mechanics, unlike political economy, was a mature science, which could be
presented as a series of deductions from well-established principles, similar to those of geometry,
a position formulated clearly only in his Mechanical Euclid [Whewell, 1837b]. This opinion was
largely inconsistent with the viewpoint promoted in his treatises of 1832, that is that mechanics was
an inductive science, which had progressed by confronting a series of empirical problems.112 However,
his predilection for Newton remained resolute ever since. He claimed that the first section of the Principia
“is eminently instructive with reference to the fundamental principles of the Differential Calculus”
[Whewell, 1832b, vii]. He also held that “the geometrical method of treating the three bodies might
have had its triumphs to point to, as well as the analytical” [Whewell, 1832c, xii]. And while, in 1823, he
had called the students’ attention to Woodhouse’s treatment of the three-body problem [Whewell, 1823,
75], in 1832 he declared that [Woodhouse, 1818] (let alone MC) was no more a “convenient book” for
the undergraduates [Whewell, 1832c, iv].
With the exception of Airy, Whewell’s followers encouraged his new attitude towards the teaching of
mechanics. In March 1832, his former student, the astronomer J.W. Lubbock, praised his new textbooks,
approving of his overall approach. In fact, Lubbock argued, to Whewell’s satisfaction, that the true
discoverers of MC were Clairaut and D’Alembert, since Laplace “did little more” than employ their
methods by “taking in terms they omitted.”113 But Whewell’s students would not share the same views.
The first evidence come in J.H. Pratt’s Mechanical philosophy [Pratt, 1836], a lucid account of the
theories of attraction and the earth’s shape, in line with Poisson’s modification of Laplace’s potential
theory. The third wrangler in 1833, Pratt expressed the frustration of generations of wranglers, who had
struggled hard to understand physical astronomy via Whewell’s and Airy’s textbooks. Without dismissing
the pedagogical virtues of geometry, Pratt criticized his tutors’ clumsy combination of analytics and
geometry, claiming that “if our course is to be geometrical, let us adhere to geometry, if analytical to
analysis; if we are to admit both (the preferable course) let us keep our systems apart; and not have our
courses of reading confused, here analysis and there geometry” [Pratt, 1836, iv].
Pratt’s treatise drew on Murphy’s Electricity [Murphy, 1833], a work inspired by Whewell [1830].114
Robert Murphy, third wrangler in 1829, presented in his book a strictly mathematical study of Laplace’s
coefficients, which attracted Pratt’s attention. Despite its abstract and general style, reminiscent of
that fostered by the AS as well as anticipating the forthcoming revival of analytics in 1839 [Panteki,
2000, 170–174], Murphy’s study was embraced by Whewell, upon the grounds that the results could
be experimentally confirmed [Grattan-Guinness, 1985, 106]. Pratt would not be the only Cambridge
wrangler, though, to criticize Whewell’s obsession with mixed mathematics, and his retreat from Laplace.
A year prior to the publication of Pratt’s book, De Morgan dared criticize the teaching of mechanics at
Cambridge, questioning within this context the utility of algebra and logic (Section 6.2). For De Morgan,
Rice, 1996, 211–219]. On the delicate links between science and religion and the hesitancy of Whewell and his circle to express
such views in public, see [Corsi, 1988, 30, Footnote 18].
112 On Whewell’s inconsistent views on the issue of induction and the philosophy of mechanics, see [Corsi, 1988, 153]. The
only reader of Thoughts to notice Whewell’s advocation of the axiomatic nature of mechanics was Hamilton (Section 6.3,
Footnote 131).
113 See Lubbock’s letter to Whewell on 2.3.1832 [Whewell Papers, Add.Ms.a.208/85].
114 On Whewell’s article, see references in Footnote 80. On Murphy and Pratt, see [Allaire, 2002, 418–422; Grattan-Guinness,
1985; Panteki, 1992, Sections 3.2–3.3; Smith, 1984a].
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intention of providing a new treatise, which would lead the student “from elementary mechanical
principles to the demonstration of celestial phenomena” [Pratt, 1836, v], was akin to De Morgan’s
unfinished project of 1827 (Section 4.3).
6.2. De Morgan’s critical reviews, 1832–1835
We have thus given an abstract of the history and methods of the most celebrated school of instruction for engineers which have ever
existed. Such an institution is the thing most wanted in this country. [De Morgan, 1831c, 73]
If Newton had not had the resources of a college fellowship or professorship, we might never have seen the Principia; and the same
might and still may be said of many others. [De Morgan, 1832d, 208]
As a student at Cambridge, De Morgan often deviated from the bounds marked by his teachers. The
best proof of his astonishing mathematical erudition is his manuscript on “Statics” in 1827, which drew
on English and French texts, hardly recommended to him by his tutors (Section 4.3). His inaugural
lecture at London University, manifested his acquaintance with the history of mathematical education
(Sections 1.2, 5.1), while his ensuing writings revealed his immense debt to famous pedagogues and
teachers, such as Condillac, Lacroix, and Laplace. We recall also the impact of Laplace’s lectures upon
his remarks concerning the instruction of algebra in SDM, a book that imitated the structure and content
of Lacroix’s Essais (Section 5). Here we call attention to his reviews of foreign and English systems
of education, in which he lamented the latter’s lack of professionalization. Our introductory quotes
exemplify his attack on the English tradition of liberal education; the former is from his article on the
Ecole Polytechnic (EP),115 and the latter from the epilogue to his paper on the “State of the mathematical
and physical sciences in the University of Oxford,” which incorporated his first comparative study of
Oxford and Cambridge.
De Morgan’s tendency to investigate and compare various educational methods may have stemmed
from his study of Lacroix’s Essais, or was at least reinforced by it. Indeed, Lacroix had provided
an extensive critical survey of the major educational institutions which had flourished in his country
since 1789, revealing his rich administrative and teaching experience; he even referred to the newly
established methods for the education of the deaf and dumb, a revolutionary accomplishment of the
French Enlightenment [Lacroix, 1828, 27–36, 56–60]. This issue inspired De Morgan’s article on the
“Methods employed for the instruction of the deaf and the dumb” [De Morgan, 1832c], holding that their
language “is as strict as any in geometry” and should thus be considered useful for the instruction of
those who can hear and speak [De Morgan, 1832c, 203, 217]. Manifesting his debt to French semiotic
philosophy, he cited it for “the student of mathematical symbols” in [De Morgan, 1836, 313, fn.].
However, the template for mathematical education would still be that promoted at Cambridge, despite
its flaws. De Morgan was above all a Cambridge wrangler, and during the period of his resignation from
London University, he was like a “satellite” of Cambridge University.116 He was very attentive to any
new publications or changes in the curriculum, furnishing reviews of the ninth edition of James Wood’s
Algebra (originally published in 1795) [De Morgan, 1832b] and Peacock’s Algebra [De Morgan, 1835a].
115 In his article [De Morgan, 1831c], De Morgan delved into a study of the administrative and educational policies of the EP
[Rice, 1996, 205].
116 See also Footnote 83.
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establishing a potential reform in the curriculum, considering that freedom as one of the most basic
advantages of Cambridge’s system. Within this context, he alluded to Peacock’s reforms, eager to stress
that their result was not the mere replacement of the fluxional notation by the differential one: “The
question was one of greater importance than appears at first sight, since on the way of settling it,
it depended the introduction or non-introduction of the writings of the French and other continental
mathematicians” [De Morgan, 1832b, 276]. He further contemplated the issue of notation in his article
“On the notation of the differential calculus adopted in some works lately published at Cambridge”
[De Morgan, 1834], indicative of his close contact with the events taking place at Cambridge.117
In his review of Wood’s book, De Morgan raised only the positive aspects of Cambridge’s system,
becoming bolder in his attack against its defects three years later. However, a middle course was taken in
his article on Oxford University, in which he exerted a mild critique on Whewell’s treatises on mechanics,
a unique instance of a direct reference to his tutor. He criticized “the Oxford market of academical
distinctions,” noting that, contrary to those of Cambridge, Oxford examiners were deprived of the liberty
of “representing correctly the various grades of merit, which are found among the candidates of each
year” [De Morgan, 1832d, 196]. Another issue at stake was the study of Newton’s Principia, “one of
the books which the aspirant for mathematical honours is expected to have studied” (205). As “it is now
universally confessed,” held De Morgan, modern methods “are of superior power,” noting that there is
much in Newton’s work, “with which it would be useless for the student to meddle.” This last comment
was opposed to Whewell’s views of 1832.
Indeed, while Whewell had claimed that the first section of the Principia was “eminently instructive
with reference” to the calculus [Whewell, 1832b, vii], De Morgan held that “The Oxford examination
comprises only of the three first sections, which is, perhaps, to be regretted, since those sections do
not contain by any means the most curious or improving part of the work” [De Morgan, 1832d, 205].
De Morgan had produced by that time an elementary Calculus [De Morgan, 1832a], as preparatory for the
student’s initiation to mechanics.118 However, cautious not to undermine his tutor’s treatise, he praised
[Whewell, 1832b], noting that “The most remarkable propositions are introduced, solved according to
Newton’s method, in their proper places, after the analytical solutions of the same questions” (205).
A third issue deserving attention was the inadequate study of logic at Oxford. De Morgan lamented
the fact that “The public examiners have recommended that logic be not absolutely required for the
candidates for mathematical honours,” adding after Whately: “we cannot see why the theoretical part of
a useful science would not be required for those, of whom it must be supposed, that they are better versed
in the practical application than their fellows” [De Morgan, 1832d, 194]. Still, Oxford’s system had at
least one merit in comparison with Cambridge’s own according to [De Morgan, 1833b, 251]:
Our readers will see that we have throughout advocated the union of the forms of logic with the reasoning of geometry. We are
convinced that it would be advantageous to make the former science systematically a part of education. If we except Oxford, there is
no place in this country where it is still retained; and unfortunately for the study, it is there more an act of memory about things called
moods and figures, than an exercise of reasoning.
117 In that paper, De Morgan made certain rather eccentric statements concerning the issue of notation, which foreshadowed
his attitude in 1835. See particularly [De Morgan, 1834, 109]. This article is highly representative of his historical orientation.
118 In line with his tract on “Statics” (Section 4.3), De Morgan’s textbook, reprinted successfully in the United States in 1943,
included portions from the calculus of functions and several examples that illustrated the useful applications of the calculus to
mechanics and astronomy [De Morgan, 1832a, 15, 52–65, 74–77, 96–102].
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wrote in his review of Peacock’s Algebra [De Morgan, 1835a, 300]:
we believe that there is no place of education in the world where the system is carried so far as at Cambridge, and certainly no place
where original effort is so much the character of education. A better system of mental training for those, who can bear it cannot be,
in our opinion: that a better plan of making the most of the average student might easily be superadded to it, we have no doubt.
The review was published in two parts in January (91–110) and April (293–311), respectively. In the
first part, he introduced the reader to the peculiarities and utility of algebraic reasoning, commenting
upon the instruction of the calculus, mechanics, algebra, and logic in connection with the curriculum at
Cambridge University. In the second part, he discussed the book under review, for the first time revealing
his opinion concerning higher algebra. Here we consider the review exclusively in relation to his defense
of both algebra and logic as basic components of a liberal education, and thereby as a potential means
towards achieving an educational reform by influencing Cambridge moderators.119
Contrary to Whewell, De Morgan viewed students as potential mathematicians, who should acquire a
proper method, regardless of its plausible utility in physical applications. For, as he argued alluding to
the student: “If he ever wishes to become a mathematician, he must not reject absolutely any proposition
because he does not understand it” (95). Moreover, recommending the perusal of Peacock’s difficult
work, he wrote (293–294):
If there be a person who cares little for the application of the pure sciences, and much for their methods, he will consider the
introduction alluded to as materially increasing their value; if there be another who treats mathematics only as a proper instrument for
obtaining and expressing physical truths, he will care but little for it. As a matter of education, we view mathematics almost entirely
in the first-mentioned light.
Interestingly enough, De Morgan’s discourse was distinctly imbued by his preference of Laplace over
Newton in the teaching of mechanics. Indeed, he established links between Laplace’s MC, algebra, and
logic, three subjects at odds with Whewell’s educational views. It is of value to follow the reasoning,
through which he implicitly attacked Whewell’s views on mechanics. Alluding to “the greater part of our
elementary treatises” (97–98), he wrote:
we consider them as good for the instances they give, and no more; we have never seen independent power obtained by means of
them. That which the student afterwards acquires he has to labour afresh; he struggles with an algebraical principle while he is already
deep into the Differential Calculus, and gets his first ideas of a common process of numbers out of his treatises on mechanics.
In other words, algebra was seen as an indispensable prerequisite for the study of the calculus and of
Laplace’s celestial mechanics. For, it was algebraic principles, not rules, that were needed in order for the
student to delve deep into current mechanics. If we take, he wrote, “the whole Mécanique Céleste from
one end to the other,” we notice that while “numerical solution” of equations occurs in few instances only,
“many simple principles, not mentioned in our books, are to be applied in almost every page of the work
119 This standpoint is new in this survey, accounting for the tone and scope of Whewell’s Thoughts, which was published a
few months later (Sections 1.2, 6.3). Historians have so far regarded [De Morgan, 1835a] as representative of his new views
on algebra and as a critique of Peacock’s epistemology; see [Pycior, 1983; Richards, 1980, 1987]. We wish to add another
perspective through which the review might be studied, namely as a motivation toward the composition of his COF in 1836.
See [Panteki, 1992, Chapter 3].
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noted that works such as this, “independently of any other merits,” show “what is actually taking place
in the world of science, and not new editions of works which have previously appeared on the matters of
which they speak” (102).
Prior to stressing the educational utility of logic, De Morgan pictured the student confronted with the
need to choose between the authority of Laplace and that of his tutor. He solved the dilemma by arguing
that “the pupil will do wisely to prefer the former,” that is “the greater authority,” for “he may depend
upon it, in nine cases out of ten at least, that those who have most reputation* among the learned are
the best guides to those who have not knowledge to judge for themselves” (94). The asterisk appended a
footnote, where he explained that “We must not be supposed to mean the popular estimate of scientific
character. The Newton of the world at large is not the Newton of the philosophers.”
De Morgan proceeded by arguing that a student will never reason correctly without “the power of
rejecting what he thinks wrong” (95), and the basic principles of logic are absolutely essential in helping
him to achieve this. To clarify his point, he assumed the case of demonstration: “A is B, B is C, C is D;
therefore A is D.” If the student is not able to immediately see whether “A is B,” he should nevertheless
not reject this proposition, but say instead: “If A is B, A is D.” Accordingly (95):
His reasoning will [. . .] be perfectly correct: for he must remember that reasoning is not the affirmation or negation of propositions,
but the right deduction of them from one another; and that though the certainty of mathematical conclusions depends upon that of the
fundamental propositions, the correctness of mathematical reasoning has nothing whatever to do with that circumstance.
This distinction between the form and matter of mathematical reasoning stemmed from his early
inquiries into the instruction of geometry. Moreover, as he had stressed in 1831, reasoning was hardly
peculiar to geometry, but present in algebra as well (Section 5.2). Realizing the intricacies involved in
Laplace’s techniques, an author notorious for omitting details of his mathematical procedures, De Morgan
mentioned the import of logic straight after his appraisal of MC, in order to reinforce the student’s
confidence if he ever decided to delve into it. Further, echoing Kirwan (Section 3.1), and anticipating
Hamilton’s review of 1836 (Section 6.3), he claimed:
The art of reasoning is exercised by mathematics, not taught by it. On the contrary there are principles of other branches of reasoning,
which are not employed in most branches of mathematics.120
Towards the end of his review, he wrote: “We should very much like to add logic in its most exact form;
an easier science than algebra, and which, come by how he may, the student must have in one sense,
before he can ever become a mathematician” (293, 311).
Having been aware of Peacock’s treatise since 1832, De Morgan felt induced to furnish excuses for
delaying the writing of his review. Firstly, he admitted his neglect of the “higher parts” of algebra,
partly “on account of the very great extent and importance of the subject” and partly “because it is
extremely difficult to draw the line which separates the elements from the higher parts” [De Morgan,
1835a, 91]. Finally, he acknowledged “the very great difficulty of forming opinions upon views so new
and so extensive” (311). Indeed, until then, he had been occupied only with elementary algebra, providing
his students in 1828 with a translation of L.P.M. Bourdon’s Algebra [Rice, 1996, 86–87; Richards, 1987,
120 This quote is from his elementary textbook on algebra [De Morgan, 1835b, 198], discussed in [Pycior, 1982, 399–402;
Richards, 1980, 354–357].
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his SDM and made note of Peacock’s book in his review of Wood’s textbook. There, confronted with
Wood’s nonrigorous presentation of Newton’s binomial formula, he wrote: “The author seems to think
he is bound to give either a proof, or something that looks like one. We hold that the less that, which is not
a proof, is made to look like one, the better” [De Morgan, 1832b, 283]. However, despite the weaknesses
of Wood’s work, he embraced it, suggesting that the “union” of Wood’s and Peacock’s textbooks “with
some parts of Bourdon’s Algebra” would comprise “all that need to be read on this subject by any student”
[De Morgan, 1832b, 277–278].
Apparently, the publication of Peacock’s “Report on the recent progress of analysis” [Peacock, 1834]
induced De Morgan to reexamine the epistemological framework of his Algebra [Peacock, 1830]. The
“Report” was devoted to an account of the many useful applications of algebraic principles in the field
of analysis, including a more detailed elaboration than in Algebra on the epistemological foundation
of these principles. As it were, Peacock’s “Report” cited in De Morgan’s review, allowed the latter to
overcome his hesitancy in forming opinions “upon views so new and so extensive.”121 It might have
also been Peacock’s “Report” that urged Whewell to investigate the nature of algebraic principles in a
manuscript book he composed on “The philosophy of the pure sciences” in 1834.122 Although aware of
his colleague’s textbook, Whewell had carefully avoided expressing any opinion for or against it. Given
his current interest in the subject, it is possible that he read De Morgan’s review in the spring of 1835,
and realized that his revised textbooks on mechanics were no longer a sufficient weapon for defending
his educational views. Were moderators to follow up De Morgan’s suggestions, then certainly Whewell’s
plans would be under severe threat, and Newton, in particular, would be subordinate to the authority of
Laplace.
6.3. Reactions and consequences
To cultivate logic as an art [. . .] appears to resemble learning horsemanship by book. [Whewell, 1835, 6]
It is a great mistake to suppose geometry any substitute for logic. [Hamilton, 1836a, 427]
For Lacroix, the elements of geometry ideally reflected those of logic, and thus “would perhaps be
the only ones that it would be necessary to study” [Lacroix, 1828, 305]. By adding that “In order to
win a race it is better to exercise the legs than to reason on the mechanism of walking,” he actually
held that for educational purposes geometry was superior to logic, since the latter’s rules were of no
practical value (Section 2.2). According to Kirwan and Whately, however, logic could be of great value
in diverse scientific pursuits. Kirwan, in particular, perceived that, though hardly devoid of fallacies
itself, logic could serve in detecting the “errors” frequently committed by mathematicians, especially
within algebra [Kirwan, 1807, iii–v]. Overshadowed by Whately’s systematic presentation of traditional
121 See De Morgan’s appeal to Peacock’s “Report” in a passage quoted above in text, in connection with the utility of advanced
algebra in the study of Laplace’s MC [De Morgan, 1835a, 102]. In his “Report” (188–194), Peacock covered the history of
algebra from Vieta up to Cauchy; he did not treat the calculi of operations and functions as algebras, thereby omitting any
reference to Babbage and Herschel. Evidently linked to his indifference to the analytics fostered by the latter (Section 4.1), this
omission would not escape De Morgan’s attention; see [De Morgan, 1840; Durand, 1990, 140].
122 On Whewell’s manuscript of 1834, see [Fisch, 1994, 270–275; Fisch, 1999, 166, Footnote 3]. Part of that manuscript would
be published in Whewell’s Philosophy in 1840.
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including De Morgan.123 However, his associations between mathematics and logic largely anticipated
De Morgan’s arguments in favor of logic’s educational import.
Lacroix’s Essais in conjunction with Whately’s Elements formed the starting point for De Morgan’s
early educational and logical inquiries. The latter offered him the rudiments of Aristotelian syllogistic
logic along with a lucid account on fallacies, while Lacroix’s near identification of geometry with logic
induced De Morgan to explore the possibility of rendering geometry in syllogistic form. Notwithstanding
the difficulties entailed in this endeavor, De Morgan realized the immense utility of logic within and be-
yond the boundaries of geometry. For, as he wrote in his article on geometry: “We have said nothing of the
other advantages of logic, as they have no relation to the subject of the article” [De Morgan, 1833b, 251].
Indeed, two years later, logic would be strongly recommended as a prerequisite for the study of algebra
and mathematics at large. For the reasoning entailed in all mathematical sciences, celestial mechanics
included, rested upon a sound knowledge of first principles, which in turn were rooted in deductive logic.
Hence he asked moderators to seriously consider the necessity of both algebra and logic forming part
of Cambridge’s liberal education. A few months later, the same moderators were confronted with the
exact opposite request via Whewell’s Thoughts, that is, to consider logic’s and algebra’s inutility within
the context of a liberal education. Whewell’s rejection of logic challenged Hamilton’s polemic review of
Thoughts, and a short-lived controversy broke out between the two men. According to historians, the
Whewell–Hamilton debate over the educational and epistemological status of logic was not without
consequences for the development of algebraic logic, but none has accounted so far for Whewell’s
particular arguments against logic in the context of a hastily written tract like the Thoughts. What we
question here is whether Whewell’s tract was meant as a reaction to De Morgan’s review of Peacock’s
Algebra. However, before we deal with this question, let us provide the chronicle of the Whewell–
Hamilton debate.
A month after the second part of De Morgan’s review appeared in April 1835, Whewell announced
to Jones his plan of composing Thoughts, cautious, however, about disclosing to him the true purpose
of his tract.124 Completed by September of the same year, Whewell’s 40-page booklet was published
in November 1835 and was then sent to his friends, who embraced it with approval.125 In its opening,
Whewell entered into a comparative study between mathematical and logical reasoning, which ended
with arguments on the superiority of mathematics over logic [Whewell, 1835, 5–8]. According to
Hamilton the comparison was groundless, and its conclusion was in full opposition to his longstanding
views on the import of logic. His response, which was nearly double the length of Thoughts, was
published in the Edinburgh Review in January 1836 [Hamilton, 1836a]. In an authoritative style, Hamilton
refuted Whewell’s views, arguing about all the dangers entailed in any study of mathematics that excluded
123 Hamilton formed a unique exception (see Section 3.2 and [Hamilton, 1836a, 440, 452]). Strangely enough, De Morgan
never referred to Kirwan in his writings, although his papers “On the syllogism” manifested his deep erudition in the history of
logic; see [De Morgan, 1966].
124 See Whewell’s letter to Jones on 26.5.1835 [Whewell Papers, Add.Ms.c.51/183]. Whewell briefly informed his friend that
the pamphlet would be based “on the principles of the true philosophy without my telling people more of them than is requisite
to be told for the purpose.” See also Footnote 131.
125 See Jones’ letter to Whewell on 11.11.1835 [Whewell Papers, Add.Ms.c.52/64] and Holland’s letter on 29.2.1836 [Whewell
Papers, Add.Ms.a.203/31]. Henry Holland (1788–1873) was an eminent physician, glad to have obtained the second edition of
Whewell’s Thoughts. We wish to stress that contrary to his longstanding habit, Whewell had carefully avoided communicating
portions of his tract to his friends prior to its publication.
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possibility for comparison, and hence no scope of mutual relation. As it were, he expressed a premonition
of a potential union effected between the two disciplines, a union visible in De Morgan’s SDM, and one
to be consolidated firmly in the near future. Whewell replied to Hamilton’s accusations by sending a
letter to the Editor of the Edinburgh Review on 23 January 1836 [Whewell, 1836a], which was published
together with Hamilton’s reply to it [Hamilton, 1836b]. The debate culminated with Whewell’s second
pedagogical tract On the Principles of English University Education [Whewell, 1837c]. Appending both
his Thoughts and Hamilton’s aggressive letter to the end of his Principles, Whewell commented upon the
latter, pronouncing himself “freed from any obligation to continue the controversy” [Whewell, 1837c,
2–3], and the whole issue was not pursued any further.126
As is known, the Whewell–Hamilton debate stimulated Boole’s algebraization of logic.127 It
reflected the longstanding antithesis between Cambridge and Oxford, engaging “a competition between
mathematics and logic around the issue of which could, and should, structure knowledge” [Durand,
1996, 446; Durand, 2000, 139, 143–152]. However, no commentator has accounted for Whewell’s
initiative to open his discourse by comparing mathematics to logic.128 Moreover, no one has noticed
that almost a decade before Boole’s mathematization of logic, a new Syllabus of Logic saw the light
of publication, a work evidently influenced by the Whewell–Hamilton debate and one to anticipate
Boole’s pioneering contributions. We are referring to [Solly, 1839], a book adorned with a passage
from Whewell’s Principles, devoted ironically enough to the unhappy consequences of a speaker’s
wrongful use of logic.129 Solly’s book remained neglected until 1847 and came too late to influence the
development of algebraic logic [Panteki, 1993]. However, notwithstanding the absence of Solly’s impact,
or the degree of his debt to the Whewell–Hamilton debate, we note that the debate might never have taken
place had it not been for Whewell’s endeavor to begin his account by comparing the two disciplines.
Let us now seek the reasons that led to the writing of Whewell’s pamphlet. First we will provide a list
of De Morgan’s educational views and recommendations that might have challenged Whewell’s project,
and then we will raise Whewell’s counterarguments. Drawing on De Morgan’s writings up to 1835,130
we distinguish the following:
(1) His elaborate defense of mathematics against common charges.
(2) A genuine concern for elementary mathematics (arithmetic, geometry, algebra, trigonometry, and the
calculus) and accordingly an empirical approach in the early stage of their instruction.
126 Whewell commented upon Hamilton’s letter in the fifth edition of his Elementary Mechanics [Whewell, 1836b, vi–ix], but
his full-length reply to the dispute was the Principles; see also Footnote 134.
127 Hamilton’s review of the Thoughts formed one of the motivations for Boole’s Mathematical Analysis of Logic in 1847,
as argued in [Laita, 1979]. According to [Durand, 1996, 470–473; Durand, 2000, 159–162], Boole’s mature Laws of Thought
in 1854 was also plausibly imbued with Whewell’s philosophy of science. In general, Whewell’s philosophical speculations
became widely known after his debate with Hamilton, bearing considerable impact upon his contemporaries, including Charles
Peirce; see [Agassi, 1991, 355, 365; Becher, 1991, 16; Fisch, 1994, 253, fn.]
128 According to [Yeo, 1993, 218], Whewell’s argument “was not with logic but with recent views on mathematics teaching.”
But can we differentiate “logic” from “the recent views on mathematical teaching” in 1835?
129 The passage runs as follows: “A single fault of logic may shew that the speaker has no distinct apprehension of the force
of demonstration; and when this judgement is formed of him, he immediately appears to sink below the standard point of
cultivation and connexion of thought” [Whewell, 1837c, 19].
130 The background discussion of these topics lies in Sections 4.0, 4.3, 5, and 6.2.
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of sound reasoning to students. Hence his plea for logic as a prerequisite to the study of geometry.
(4) The recommendation of Lacroix’s Essais and Whately’s Elements to both students and instructors.
(5) His critical approach to English liberal education and his comparative study of the systems followed
at Oxford and Cambridge.
(6) His attribution to algebra of a degree of reasoning equivalent to that traditionally entailed in geometry.
Moreover, his serious consideration of algebra as an indispensable prerequisite to the study of the
calculus and mechanics.
(7) His predilection for Laplace over Newton in celestial mechanics, and his admiration for French
institutions, such as the Ecole Normale and the Ecole Polytechnique.
(8) Last, but not least, his acknowledgment of the authority possessed by Cambridge moderators, and his
direct appeal to them in 1835 in an attempt to influence the shaping of the University’s curriculum to
meet with his educational standpoint.
Whewell’s Thoughts relates to these points thus:
(1′) Whewell held that mathematics was viewed either as “a most admirable mental discipline” or as a
habit of thought that makes the mind “captious, disputatious, over subtle, over rigid” (3), considering
it rather “obvious” that in his discourse it was to be viewed “as an example and exercise of exact
reasoning” (4). Moreover, at the end he claimed that his purpose had been to speak “of the study
of mathematics as a logical and philosophical discipline of the mind” (45). However, his arguments
in defense of this view hardly covered one page of his tract (see point (3′)). So when accused by
Hamilton for being inconsistent with his statements, he replied that the main scope of his book was
to contemplate only “what kind of mathematics is the most beneficial as part of a liberal education”
[Whewell, 1836a, 271]. Thus, in a work devoid of any reference to the history of mathematical
instruction, Whewell accomplished his task in a rather unorthodox way; that is, by dismissing in
turn the teaching of mathematics as based (a) on arbitrary definitions (11–31), (b) on experience
(32–35), and (c) on general procedures (35–39). As it were, points (a) and (c) constituted the basis
of algebra, and analytics at large.
(2′) With the exception of geometry (11–16) and instances from the calculus (16–18), elementary
mathematics had no place in Whewell’s discourse. Moreover, Whewell was concerned with issues
of instruction only when related to purely physical notions (see point (6′)). In the context of issue
(b) above, he dismissed the empirical approach in education and hinted at his position on the
philosophy of mechanics, which should be regarded in line with geometry, as an axiomatically
grounded science (33–35)131—a strong indication of his overall indifference for the instruction of
131 Accepting more or less Whewell’s points (a) and (c), Hamilton raised six distinct objections against Whewell’s
philosophical approach as regards issue (b) [Hamilton, 1836a, 414, 416–417]. He repeated his arguments in his “Notes”
[Hamilton, 1836b, 274], to which Whewell alluded to in [Whewell, 1836b, viii]. Consequently, Whewell exposed his views
on the axiomatic nature of mechanics in the “Remarks on mathematical reasoning and on the logic of induction,” appended
to his [Whewell, 1837b, 143–182]. From Jones’ reaction to Whewell’s “Remarks” (see Jones’ letter to Whewell on 13.5.1837
[Whewell Papers, Add.Ms.c.52/69], where he called Whewell’s Euclid a “pocket-pistol”), it becomes crystal clear that Whewell
had feared this reaction since May 1835, and had been cryptic all along about issue (b), and also that Jones had overlooked this
issue when going through his friend’s pamphlet after its publication.
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branches of mathematics were those deployed in Newton’s Principia.
(3′) According to Whewell, a student of mathematics, compelled to fix his attention on the conditions
upon which demonstration depends, is presented with “the most natural fallacies, which he sees
exposed and corrected” (6). Moreover, he becomes accustomed to long chains of deduction and the
“usual forms of inference,” thus learning continuity of attention and coherency of thought. Aware
that “all depends upon his first principles,” the student “flows inevitably from them,” certain of
the “necessity and constant identity of the conclusion legitimately deduced from them” (7). These
arguments constituted his sole vindication of mathematical studies against common charges. At
the same time, these advantages were juxtaposed with the properties of pure logical reasoning, in
order to prove geometry’s superiority in teaching accurate reasoning. As he claimed, logic does not
familiarize us with “trains of strict reasoning,” since it regards special deductions “only as examples
of forms of arguments”; and if a fallacy exists, the student is provided with rules “by which it
may be condemned and made more glaringly wrong” (7). Thus mathematics (always conceived as
geometry) enables one to form “logical habits better than logic itself” (7–8).
(4′) As Hamilton observed [Hamilton, 1836a, 412], Whewell did not refer to any authority in order to
sustain his arguments. However, Whewell was well acquainted with Lacroix’s Essais,132 upon which
he apparently drew. Note, for example, the similarity between Lacroix’s metaphor on running and
Whewell’s on horse-riding, deployed with the purpose of proving the inutility of logic’s rules (6):
For reasoning—a practical process—must, I think, be taught by practice better than by precept, in the same manner as fencing
or riding [. . .]. It is desirable, not so much to define good arguments, as to feel their force; not so much to classify fallacies as
to shun them; just as the horseman tries to obtain a good seat rather than to describe one, and rather avoids falling than consider
in how many ways he may fall.
In this way, Whewell ridiculed the educational utility of logic, along with refuting the opinion
according to which logic was considered necessary for the proper study of geometry. And such
an opinion was but peculiar to De Morgan’s early writings.
(5′) As the title of his tract shows, Thoughts on the Study of Mathematics as a Part of a Liberal
Education, Whewell took for granted the traditional system of education at Cambridge. In full
accordance to it, he viewed students as future “lawyers, or men of business, or statesmen” (40),
contrary to De Morgan’s consideration of them as potential mathematicians (Section 6.2). In the
opening pages of his tract, he appeared eager to enter into a critical overview of the prevailing
systems of English liberal education. Indeed, by posing the question “what is the best instrument for
educating men in reasoning?” (5), he alluded to Cambridge and Oxford University respectively by
claiming:
There are two principal means, which have been used for this purpose in our Universities; the study of Mathematics and the
study of Logic. These may be considered respectively as the teaching of reasoning by practice and by rule.
132 As mentioned in Footnote 23, Whewell had been aware of Lacroix’s Essais at least since February 1821. It is quite
plausible that he recommended it to De Morgan, but this is a purely tentative assumption. Interestingly enough, when attacked
by Hamilton for lack of historical erudition on mathematical education [Hamilton, 1836a, 412], Whewell asked him to propose
titles of works on logic, which could serve as “rival instruments of education” to mathematics [Whewell, 1836a, 271–272].
Hamilton found Whewell’s request “misplaced” and declined to provide him with related bibliography [Hamilton, 1836b, 274].
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and proceeded with still more rejections in connection with the teaching of mathematics (see
point (1′) and points (6′) and (7′) below).
Noting also the Cambridge–Oxford controversy (Section 3.2), could we infer from points (3′)–(5′)
that what Whewell had meant to do was to downgrade the whole educational system at Oxford
University? Neither the rest of the tract, nor his correspondence at the time (including that with
Hamilton), exhibits such an interpretation. His rejection of logic as a plausible candidate for entering
the curriculum can be accounted for only as a reaction against De Morgan’s plea in 1835. In
fact, Whewell’s ultimate aim was to persuade moderators about the utmost importance of mixed
mathematics in a liberal education (points (6′) and (8′)), and the ways he invented to sustain this
view appear less arbitrary and incomprehensible if seen in opposition to the structure and content
of De Morgan’s review. The message delivered in the latter was closely linked with De Morgan’s
vision; a sound foundation in the principles of pure mathematics, which would ideally afford the
student’s initiation into Laplace’s most wanted work on celestial mechanics. And to this end, logic
was an indispensable tool. However tentative, this standpoint illuminates a major part of Whewell’s
Thoughts, in which the author had to refute each one of De Morgan’s arguments in order to achieve
his goal.
Whewell’s pamphlet may be viewed additionally as a vehicle of his current philosophical position
on the axiomatic nature of mechanics, as hinted at in the context of issue (b), the main novelty of
his pamphlet (point (2′)). In fact, his attention to logic seems hardly irrelevant to this latter goal
if examined under the light of his Euclid [Whewell, 1837b].133 Still, it is hard to discern whether
Thoughts had been intended as a predecessor of Euclid, or if it served à posteriori to sustain the
philosophical position in the latter work. But we hold that De Morgan’s review offered at least
the incentive for his sudden plan of May 1835, and in particular the inspiration for the arguments
exposed in points (3′)–(5′).
(6′) Contrary to De Morgan, for Whewell algebraic and symbolical methods afforded no scope for the
exercise of the faculty of reasoning, since a student trained in viewing problems in an algebraic
manner would miss the whole point of comprehending physical notions. Indeed, as he claimed in
the context of point (a) against arbitrary definitions, by viewing physical notions in an algebraic way
“it will be no wonder if his notions always remain mere algebraical abstraction, without mechanical
value or meaning” (26). Furthermore, algebra was rejected within the context of point (c), as
representing a general mathematical method (point (7′)). Lastly, by addressing moderators he
wrote (44):
133 No matter what might had been Whewell’s initial motivation to open his Thoughts with a comparative study between
mathematics and logic, this study was far from accidental or trivial. Whewell’s publications in 1837 prove that his views
concerning the comparison of the two disciplines were further consolidated after his shortlived debate with Hamilton. Best
proof for our claim is found in the “Remarks” appended to his Euclid (Footnote 131), where Whewell repeated the same
arguments in favor of mathematics in a more sophisticated tone, in order to proceed from an opposition between logic with
geometry to his ultimate comparison between geometry and mechanics, which culminated with his novel theory on the “Logic
of induction.” On the latter, we refer the reader to [Fisch, 1991, 57; Richards, 1980; Richards, 1988, 20–27; Todhunter, 1876, I,
Chapters 7–10; Yeo, 1993, 160].
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if necessary let the knowledge of Algebra be required no longer, for I can hardly believe that this part of our mathematical
teaching is of much value in any point of view,
further arguing that the most “instructive,” “simple,” and “philosophical” branches of mathematics
after plane geometry, were mechanics and hydrostatics (45).
Later evidence can account for his utter rejection of algebra as an impulsive reaction to the potential
threat stemming from De Morgan’s review. For, happy to note in 1837 that his request for mechanics
and hydrostatics had been met with approval by the moderators, Whewell admitted the utility of
some parts of algebra in the study of mechanics, going as far as speaking with admiration of
Peacock’s Algebra, his first public reference to that work.134
(7′) Whewell’s opposition to general procedures in teaching in point (c) (35–39) may be viewed as a
polemic against the preference for analytics used by the AS at Cambridge, French mathematics and
mechanics at large. Indeed, alluding to Lagrange and Laplace, he wrote (36–37):
The great geniuses of the mathematical world have always delighted in the widest generalizations, because they have by nature
possessed this distinctness of particular knowledge, and have thus been able to perform the ascent to generalities and the
descent to particulars with a secure rapidity. But these are feats of strength and agility, which it is not given to all to imitate.
The talent of generalization is the last, which is developed in the mathematical students.
Whewell also elaborated on his former arguments of 1832, stressing again that the first sections of
Principia were the best introduction for the student’s acquaintance with the calculus, hiding between
the lines his newly conceived “Theory of Fundamental Ideas” (FI).135
(8′) Whewell’s views on mixed mathematics and Newton were not new in this pamphlet (Sections 4.2,
6.1). But here for the first time he addressed moderators directly. Indeed, in the final pages of the
Thoughts he wrote: “But whether such a system of mathematical study shall or shall not prevail in
this University, must depend entirely upon our Examiners” (43).
His message is summarized thus: “It is highly for the interest of the University that the over
disposition to analytical generalizations should not be fostered;—that a clear acquaintance with first
principles in all subjects should be demanded, and that to each subject its own proper principles
should be assigned” (42). He thus insisted that each subject be treated by particular methods,
134 In both his Euclid and the Principles, Whewell acknowledged the fulfillment of his demands concerning the inclusion of
more applied mathematics in the lower examination for a degree [Whewell, 1837b, vii; Whewell, 1837c, 17]. The first chapter
of Euclid was devoted to instances from Wood’s Algebra, while in his Principles we read: “We ought, therefore, to include in
our course, not only pure mathematical sciences, geometry, arithmetic, and algebra, . . .” [Whewell, 1837c, 16]. Furthermore, in
the “Additional thoughts on the study of mathematics” (177–186), which followed the reprint of the Thoughts, he argued for
the utility of algebra in the realm of analytic geometry, praising accordingly Peacock’s treatise (179). By incorporating such
opposing views on the utility of algebra (as in the reprint of Thoughts and the “Additional thoughts”), Whewell’s Principles
is a much more controversial work than his initial educational pamphlet, and, merits further attention, especially as regards
Whewell’s final reply to Hamilton. On Whewell’s ambivalent approach to symbolic algebra, see additional comments in [Fisch,
1994, 270–275; Richards, 1980, 350–353].
135 In his text Whewell vindicated the Newtonian “conception” of “limit” [Whewell, 1835, 12–20], where “conception” stood
for what was called later on a “fundamental idea” (FI). On the origins of his theory of FI, see Whewell’s letter to Jones on
21 August 1834 [Whewell Papers, Add.Ms.c.51/175]. On Whewell’s FI and his philosophy of the calculus (which would be of
significant impact upon De Morgan), see [Becher, 1980b, 27–30; Fisch, 1991, 36, 56–58; Richards, 1987, 23–29; Yeo, 1993,
13, 189, 192, 216].
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and geometry (Section 5.2), fostered the view of common reasoning underlying all branches of
mathematics, emphasizing logic’s utility upon these grounds.
7. Epilogue
When the study of mathematics revived at the University of Cambridge, so also did the study of logic. The moving spirit was Whewell
[. . .]. Doubtless De Morgan was influenced in his logical investigations by Whewell; [MacFarlane, 1916, 29]
The correspondence with Dr. Whewell, which had begun soon after the pupil left Cambridge, related at first to Mathematical questions.
But when Mr. De Morgan began to make the application of Mathematical principles to Logic, Dr. Whewell was naturally one of the
first to whom his ideas were communicated. [S. De Morgan, 1882, 112–113]
Our survey focused on the origins of De Morgan’s early involvement with logic, the latter ranging from
accurate mathematical reasoning, equally present in geometry, arithmetic, and algebra, to Aristotelian
syllogistic logic. The roots of his relevant concerns were sought after in French semiotic philosophy, the
current English tradition of Aristotelian logic, his Cambridge background in mathematics and mechanics,
and last in his own critical reviews and writings on the ideal instruction of mathematics and mechanics.
Indeed, the study of the latter manifested an extraordinary mélange of diverse stimuli, indicative of
De Morgan’s capacity to critically assimilate ideas stemming from a variety of educational systems and
institutions, such as the Ecole Normale, the Ecole Polytechnique, Oxford, and Cambridge.
For all his critical disposition to its flaws, the educational system of Cambridge University would
have an enduring impact upon his foundational concerns. As he confessed to Whewell in 1861, he had
been fortunate to have studied there in the “interval between two systems” (Section 4.0). During the
transitional period of the 1820s, students were challenged by questions such as “fluxions or differentials”
and “Newton or Laplace,” thus induced to form their own distinct opinions concerning the unsettled
foundations of the calculus and mechanics. Among them De Morgan retained for over “thirty years” the
conviction that he could adopt “any one of the systems on which infinity is explained” [De Morgan, 1865,
146]. But such questions of priority, and epistemological debates at large, would remain in the order of
the day in and around Cambridge after his graduation in 1827.
Due to the Cambridge–Oxford debate on political economy in 1831, the long-standing controversy
over “deduction or induction” reemerged, while later on Tripos wranglers and moderators were
called to choose between “geometrical or analytical procedures,” “pure or applied mathematics,” and
“mathematics or logic” at large. By viewing the implications of such questions through De Morgan’s
eyes, we have hopefully shed light not only on the neglected origins of his early logical inquiries, but
also on the latter’s dynamics. In what follows below, we present a summary of our survey, elucidating its
structure, along with raising questions that may contribute to a more comprehensive future study of the
joint development of mathematics and logic in England of the 1830s.
Our survey was based upon two comparative studies, one of De Morgan and Lacroix, and another of
De Morgan and Whewell, as it was these two men who drew De Morgan’s attention to the instruction
of mathematics and mechanics, respectively. Under their dual influence, De Morgan became ardently
involved with the study of the first principles of the mathematical sciences, eventually raising the import
of logic as a most indispensable prerequisite for them. The role of his mentors occasionally proved to
be subtle and obscure, a fact that accounts for the length of our inquiry. As a matter of fact, our second
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evidence.
Geometry and mechanics are the key words underlying our two comparative studies respectively.
After having read Lacroix’s Essais, De Morgan was above all inspired by the critique of the PRL against
the traditional teaching of Euclid’s Elements and Lacroix’s near identification of geometry with formal
logic. The latter’s impact was mostly evident in De Morgan’s SDM, which imitated Lacroix’s Essais
in both its content and structure. Additionally, armed with Whately’s Elements, De Morgan ventured to
cast Pythagoras’ theorem into syllogistic form. In so doing, he took the first step towards the extension
of syllogistic logic, while along parallel lines he inquired into the wider educational import of logic
(Sections 2, 3.1, 5, 6.2).
In connection with Whewell, we pointed out his peculiar oscillation between Newton and Laplace
(Section 4.2), arguing that in conjunction with Airy they motivated De Morgan’s project on “Statics”
in 1827 and his enduring passion for astronomy and its history (Section 4.3). As it were, De Morgan
gradually switched his attention from the principles of mechanics to those parts of elementary
mathematics with which a student should be well acquainted prior to his study of that branch
(Sections 4.3, 5). Although a Cambridge outsider, De Morgan kept well informed about both the
curriculum’s expansion and Whewell’s counterrevolution (Section 6.1). He reacted accordingly through
his numerous critical reviews, eventually asking moderators to seriously consider higher algebra and logic
as basic components of the curriculum (Section 6.2). Last, we contrasted De Morgan’s and Whewell’s
views on the educational import of logic in 1835, thus hinting at the apparent instant import of De
Morgan’s early logical investigations (Section 6.3). But this last part of our investigation appears to be in
want of further clarification.
How far are we entitled to assume that Whewell was acquainted with De Morgan’s contributions by
1835? Moreover, was there indeed any ground for a mutual influence between the two men as regards
the field of logic? Interestingly enough, it was exactly the latter question, which, posed long ago, led
us to discover the close affinity between Lacroix’s and De Morgan’s work. That question had stemmed
from MacFarlane’s and Sophie De Morgan’s claims, partly quoted in the opening of our epilogue. So,
at first we built our inquiries assuming that De Morgan derived “an interest in the renovation of logic”
from Whewell [MacFarlane, 1916, 20], an assumption further reinforced by S. De Morgan’s evidence as
regards the communication between former tutor and pupil on logical issues in the 1840s [S. De Morgan,
1882, 113]. Relatively soon, though, it became clear that both of De Morgan’s biographers failed to
distinguish sharply between inductive and deductive logic. This is best manifested in MacFarlane’s claim
that Whewell was the “moving spirit” in the renovation of logic, through his two treatises on the History
[Whewell, 1837a] and Philosophy of the inductive sciences in the late 1830s [MacFarlane, 1916, 29]. But
before we proceed, let us not wholly dismiss MacFarlane’s somewhat inaccurate claim, given some of the
currently acknowledged consequences that Whewell’s debate with Hamilton had upon the development
of formal logic (Section 6.3).
Under the stimulus of De Morgan’s biographers, we began searching for any traces concerning
Whewell’s own logical concerns, digging up his voluminous correspondence and thus coming across
his notes on Lacroix’s Essais and his confessions to Jones in connection with Whately.136 Moreover,
puzzled with a passage from his revised Dynamics in 1832, where he spoke of “good logic” being “the
136 In connection with Lacroix and Whately, see, respectively, Footnote 23 and the letters cited in Footnotes 49, 53, and 54.
Aware of the fact that we have treated Whewell’s involvement with induction very tangentially (Sections 3.2, 6.1), we direct
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Astronomy a year later (Section 3.2), we were induced to consult all his publications until 1837, aiming to
understand Whewell’s conception of “logic.” As a result, we focused on his Thoughts, realizing the import
of his poorly studied debate with Hamilton.137 A great deal of this investigation has been unfortunately
considered irrelevant to the main scope of our survey, and is thus here omitted. Nevertheless, it gave
rise to our overview on French “Logique” and British “Logic” at the turn of the century (Sections 2, 3),
inducing further attention to the diverse interpretations of the term “logic” in England of the 1830s.
In connection with induction, we refer to De Morgan’s relevant chapter in his Formal Logic
[De Morgan, 1847, 211–226], a chapter that may well have surfaced in imitation of Whately’s Elements
(Section 3.1). In its opening we read that “there is not much to say upon the genuine meaning of the
word [induction], in any system of formal logic” [De Morgan, 1847, 211]. De Morgan’s indifference to
inductive logic is further revealed in the letters exchanged between him and Whewell from 1846 onward.
These letters, highly indicative of their distinct predilection for deductive and inductive logic respectively,
manifest that the main reason De Morgan communicated his current logical inquiries to Whewell was
to consult him strictly on issues concerning the nomenclature of logic.138 Thus, if Whewell was of any
impact upon De Morgan’s mature work on logic, the degree of his influence appears rather insignificant,
and far from pertaining to the period under investigation.
Focusing now on the period from 1823 up to 1831, we have no evidence as regards a plausible way
through which Whewell might have instilled in his pupil a passion for logic, in the wider meaning of
the term. We recall in particular that Whewell’s plan to deliver lectures on induction in 1826 had been
postponed to the early 1830s (Sections 3.2, 6.1). There might have been, however, a subtle way by
which Whewell implicitly attracted De Morgan’s attention to Whately’s third edition of the Elements
(1829), the edition that triggered the Oxford–Cambridge debate on political economy in 1831 and the
one recommended to the reader of SDM (Section 3.2). At the time, Whately was on friendly terms with
Baden Powell, an active member of the SDUK from 1830 and a contributor to the QJE. Being in close
collaboration with De Morgan, Powell possibly acted as a channel between Oxford, Cambridge, and
De Morgan in the early 1830s, reinforcing in particular the latter’s high estimation for Whately.139
the reader’s attention to Jones’ influential attempts to distill into his friend a satisfactory definition of the process of induction,
a topic to enter their correspondence from 1822 onward. See, particularly, Jones’ lengthy letter of 7.3.1831 [Whewell Papers,
Add.Ms.c.51/26], a letter imbued by his prominent study of Aristotle and Bacon on the issue of induction.
137 Aspects of the Whewell–Hamilton debate have been discussed in [Durand, 1996, 450–459; Durand, 2000, 144–152;
Garland, 1980, 39–43; Laita, 1979, 47–49; Panteki, 2000, 191–192; Richards, 1988, 20–27; Todhunter, 1876, I, 94–95; Yeo,
1993, 218–219]. However, a full account of this epoch-making debate has yet to be written.
138 See the letters fully quoted in [S. De Morgan, 1882, 194–201, 228–229, 302–308, 315–320], the earliest dated 21 October
1846. We have traced two more letters, dated 3 and 5 October 1846, in which De Morgan announced to Whewell his plan
of composing a work on “formal logic” [Whewell Papers, Add.Ms.a.202/104–105]. In fact, a third letter of 30 April 1844
[Whewell Papers, Add.Ms.a.202/100] reveals that their discussion upon philosophical issues dated back at least to 1844.
139 On De Morgan’s early acquaintance with Whately’s name, see Footnote 90. Further on Powell, see Footnote 92 and
[Corsi, 1988, 37–39, 44], a work wholly dedicated to Powell’s scientific and theological contributions. In his article on Oxford
University, De Morgan mentioned Powell’s preceding article on the “defects of the scientific education given at Oxford” with
appraisal [De Morgan, 1832d, 191]. Whewell and Jones kept expressing to one another their contempt for the “immoral” theory
of the Ricardians on political economy much earlier than 1831; see Jones’ letter to Whewell on 27.11.1827 [Whewell Papers,
Add.Ms.c.52/15]. De Morgan seemed already aware of the importance of this branch in 1828, referring to political economy in
his [De Morgan, 1828, 2]. We hold that it is more than plausible that the ensuing Cambridge–Oxford debate was known to him
at the time and had a stimulating impact upon his philosophical speculations.
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logic. However, a further comparative study of their writings entices the view that Whewell was well
aware of De Morgan’s educational contributions and affected by them. Both men had strong views
as regards the status of geometry, Whewell admiring Euclid beyond any criticism, and De Morgan
being distinctly under the influence of the PRL, moreover differentiating his position from Lacroix’s
as to the alleged sufficiency of geometry in teaching the principles of strict, accurate reasoning. It is
more than probable that Whewell read De Morgan’s SDM and was confronted from its first pages with
De Morgan’s initial empirical approach towards the instruction of mathematics, geometry included. For,
in his Euclid, he repeated De Morgan’s arguments concerning Euclid’s axiom on straight lines in order
to draw conclusions opposed to those put forward by De Morgan. Interestingly enough, Whewell’s
presentation of Euclid’s axiom on straight lines was to be critically commented upon in De Morgan’s
advanced treatise on the Calculus.140 We are thus tempted to hold that De Morgan and Whewell “seem
to have played a game with each other quoting Euclid passages, and not citing each other (so that nobody
previously has noticed).”141
Nevertheless, there does exist one evidence as to the diffusion of De Morgan’s early contributions,
namely Peacock’s “Report,” delivered in 1833. Peacock noted De Morgan’s translation of Bourdon’s
Algebra in 1828 [Peacock, 1834, 287] with appraisal, addressing De Morgan as:
a gentleman whose philosophical work on Arithmetic and whose various publications on the elementary and higher parts of
mathematics, and particularly those which have reference to mathematics education, entitle his opinion to the greatest consideration.
We regard Peacock’s acknowledgement of De Morgan’s work as far from trivial, given his total absence
of reference to the notable contributions of William Wallace, Babbage, and Herschel in analytics.142
Peacock’s “Report” became widely known, in and outside the realms of Cambridge, as was proven in
the case of Wallace [Panteki, 1987]. Moreover, since Peacock appeared so well versed in De Morgan’s
contributions by 1833, it might not be a bold conjecture to assume that so must have been other
Cambridge dons, and in particular Whewell, who by 1832 had begun communicating with De Morgan
on mechanics and astronomy.143
Focusing on the issue of logic, the Whewell–De Morgan relationship will remain a mystery. While
our study so far largely refutes MacFarlane’s claim concerning Whewell’s alleged influence upon
De Morgan’s work on logic, instances from their correspondence induce us to believe that there might
have been a deeper degree of understanding between them, despite the contrasting directions of their
research. For example, De Morgan wrote to Whewell on 12 July 1850 [S. De Morgan, 1882, 212–213]:
140 Compare [De Morgan, 1831a, 2] with [Whewell, 1837b, 148–149], and consequently the latter with [De Morgan, 1842, 6].
It is quite striking that the “Introductory” chapter of De Morgan’s Calculus above cited would contain remarks on Euclidian
geometry, as well as lengthy comments against Whewell’s abuse of the term “logic” [De Morgan, 1842, 12–13, fn.], without
naming him in either case. See further comments in Footnote 98. We wish also to clarify a significant detail; although the
Calculus was published in parts from 1836, the above-cited “Introductory” chapter was found to have been dated from 1842.
141 Interestingly enough, although the preceding arguments presented in our text had not been included in any of the former
versions of this paper, our concluding comment in quotes was offered by an anonymous referee.
142 In connection with Babbage and Herschel, see Footnote 121. On Wallace (1768–1843), a Scottish mathematician, see
[Panteki, 1987], an annotated commentary upon Wallace’s letter to Peacock in 1833, in which he lamented the latter’s
indifference to his contributions in the introduction of analytics in early 19th century Britain.
143 See De Morgan’s letters to Whewell on 12 November 1832 and 13 April 1833 [Whewell Papers, Add.Ms. a.202/96-97].
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named, for a lecture against meddling with logic by help of mathematics. Pray get this work and read it carefully.
And we ask: How far was Whewell, a fierce opponent of formal logic, able or willing to help his former
student deal with Hamilton’s attack, especially on an issue upon which Whewell himself would have had
the same objections as Hamilton?
Resuming De Morgan’s logical contributions, we underline that his account of traditional syllogistic
logic, enriched with the copula “is equal to” and the “à fortiori syllogism,” was elaborated upon in
the First Notions of Logic in 1839, subsequently constituting the first chapter of his Formal Logic in
1847. None of his publications after 1831 incorporated his partial reduction of Pythagoras’ theorem in
syllogistic form, an impossible assignment, as we now know, without first order predicate logic [Merrill,
1990, 15]. Realizing the impossibility of this project, De Morgan wrote in his fourth paper “On the
syllogism” that geometry “is of little, though some, account for technical exercise in the syllogism”
[De Morgan, 1860a, 241]. As a matter of fact, he never ceased to associate these two branches, and
in his Speech to the LMS he again raised the import of logic in geometry, furnishing instances from
Euclid’s Elements as examples of “bad reasoning” [De Morgan, 1866, 5], which were in want of a sound
knowledge of logic’s first principles. It is hardly surprising upon these grounds that his Notions was
meant, according to its subtitle, as “Preparatory for the student of geometry.” What is quite surprising,
though, is that it had been additionally destined to form an Appendix to his Arithmetic.
Indeed, as De Morgan wrote in his third paper “On the syllogism” [1858, 116, Footnote 1]:
Nineteen years ago I wrote my First Notions of Logic, intended, as the preface states, ultimately to become an appendix to my
Arithmetic. I had not then any glimpse, so far as my memory serves, of the numerical syllogism: and I doubt if I could have given any
very distinct account of my reason for appending the common syllogism to a book of numbers. But it may be that my now confirmed
notion of the usual form of syllogism being arithmetical was germinating.
De Morgan’s numerically definite syllogism was conceived in 1846, to be further expanded in his Formal
Logic, thereafter bearing significant import on the shaping of his LOR.144 As an indicative example of
this scheme, we append
mXs are Y s,
(7.1)nY s are Zs,
(n+m− s)Xs are Zs,
where s is the number of Y s given in advance. If De Morgan could not account for the exact origins
of this scheme, we are hardly entitled to offer any interpretation other than rephrasing his last sentence:
i.e., that it was not only geometry which apparently inspired his early logical inquiries, but that he was
also aided by his parallel inquiry into establishing the science of arithmetic upon as firm foundations as
geometrical reasoning itself (Section 5.2). De Morgan’s numerical scheme has been largely overlooked
by recent commentators of his mature logical contributions. Overstressed in [MacFarlane, 1916, 29] as
the most “remarkable” aspect of his Formal Logic, De Morgan’s arithmetical scheme had been the par
144 On De Morgan’s arithmetical scheme (including (7.1) in text), see [De Morgan, 1846, 17–19; De Morgan, 1847, 142–145;
De Morgan, 1860b, 258–263], a novelty amply dealt with in [Panteki, 1992, Section 6.6]. On a different note, see [Rice, 1997b,
2–3].
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opportunity to develop his purely formal logical scheme.145
De Morgan’s Notions deserve a final comment before we close our survey. Far from constituting an
original piece of work, when compared to SDM and the ensuing Formal Logic, the Notions acquire a
distinct place in the history of English formal logic when viewed in conjunction with Solly’s Syllabus
of Logic. Both works were composed by former Cambridge students, both addressed students of
mathematics, and both appeared early in 1839, not to mention their common anticomformistic religious
standpoints, which were radically opposed to those enjoyed by their Cambridge tutors, and Whewell in
particular.146 For all their distinct mathematical illustrations and procedures, the most striking feature of
these two works was their timing, as well as their ultimate goal. Published only a few months after the
appearance of De Morgan’s Notions, Solly’s Syllabus answers to all of De Morgan’s aspirations in 1835,
along with rendering true all the fears and premonitions of Whewell and Hamilton, his distant mentors.147
For, drawing on the newly furnished foundation of algebraic symbolical methods by D.F. Gregory, Solly
held that the connection between symbolic algebra and logic would help the student acquire a sound
foundation of logic’s indispensable principles [Solly, 1839, iii].148
Upon these grounds, we hold that any future comprehensive study of the development of formal logic
in England during the first half of the century should incorporate a brief comparative study of Solly’s
and De Morgan’s textbooks of 1839, further exploring their distinct connection with the Whewell–
Hamilton debate over the epistemological and educational status of mathematics and logic. Such a
survey should also include a reference to De Morgan’s neglected work on the COF in 1836, and the
latter’s debt to the “form–matter” distinction stemming from L. Carnot’s Réflexions sur la métaphysique
infinitesimal (1797), whose author was mentioned with appraisal in De Morgan’s review within the
context of Peacock’s novel jargon: “Except perhaps Carnot, we know of no writer, who has dwelt upon
the meaning of his phrases” [De Morgan, 1835a, 310–311].149
145 A study of De Morgan’s numerically definite syllogism, and of the relevant implications of the De Morgan–Hamilton debate
on the issue of predication, is strikingly absent in [Merrill, 1990, 91]. De Morgan’s own writings hint clearly at the import of this
debate in his own work, stressing that Hamilton’s predicated scheme “accidentally” overlapped with his own [De Morgan, 1850,
32–35, 42, 49; De Morgan, 1860b, 258–263]. De Morgan’s evidence is taken under consideration in [Panteki, 1992, Chapter 6].
146 Solly was elected a scholar at Gonville and Caius College in 1835, but being a Unitarian, he left in 1837, without obtaining
a degree, staying around Cambridge until 1839 [Panteki, 1993, 133]. The best source for De Morgan’s upbringing and his
religious standpoint is [S. De Morgan, 1882, 1–18]. Solly’s work would ideally fit in the context of [Richards, 2002], a paper
with which we became acquainted while finishing off our epilogue. Her comparative study of Whewell’s and De Morgan’s
different views on mathematics and logic in term of their distinct theological beliefs is complementary to our survey, which has
treated such matters tangentially.
147 Solly’s work was published a few months after the appearance of De Morgan’s Notions, but independent of it, as implied
from their first communication in 1847 [Panteki, 1993, 134–135]. On the significance of these two works as regards the
Whewell–Hamilton debate, see also [Panteki, 2000, 190–193]. While Whewell’s apparent influence upon the shaping of Solly’s
mathematical and philosophical speculations (which drew heavily on Kant) is hinted at in [Panteki, 1993, 143, 152, Footnote 23],
we wish to add another valuable source, traced later, in connection with Hamilton, a close friend, as it were, of the Solly family;
see [Solly, 1893, I, 327; II, 65].
148 On Gregory’s pioneering contributions to the realms of symbolic algebra, see [Allaire, 2002]. On Gregory’s apparent impact
upon Solly, see [Panteki, 1993, 137–140, 149–151, 163–165; Panteki, 2000, 190–193].
149 Carnot’s work and its evident impact upon [De Morgan, 1836], and consequently upon the development of the LOR, has
been extensively studied and discussed in [Panteki, 1992, Chapters 1, 2, 3, 6, 9]. We suggest here that a further epistemological
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a visionary, a critic and a catalyst during the crucial period of the 1830s within the wider sphere of
influence of Cambridge University. In accordance to our final suggestions, we repeat his words while
addressing the LMS, holding that indeed “We want a great deal of study of the connection of Logic and
Mathematics” [De Morgan, 1866, 4].
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